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INTRODUCTION

The Persian Gulf War began when Iraq invaded Kuwait on
August 2, 1990. l Following this invasion, the United States deployed
troops to Saudi Arabia and engaged in an offensive military operation
against Iraq. 2 February 27, 1995 marked the fourth anniversary of
the formal end of the Gulf War.3 For many Gulf War veterans, it
1. Caryle Murphy, Iraqi Invasion Force Seizes Control of Kuwait, WASH. POST,
Aug. 3, 1990, at Al; see also 38 U.S.C. § 101(33) (Supp. V 1993) ("The term
'Persian Gulf War' means the period beginning on August 2, 1990, and ending
on the date thereafter prescribed by Presidential proclamation or by law.").
2. Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12, 13 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
3. Laura Flanders, Mal de Guerre, NATION, Mar. 7, 1994, at 292.
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also marked their fourth year of coping with a debilitating illness

commonly known as Gulf War Syndrome (GWS). 4 Of the 695,000
veterans who served in the war, "at least 45,000 are suffering from

symptoms [of GWS] connected with their service." 5 The most common of these symptoms include: fatigue, respiratory problems, blurred
vision, neurological damage, muscle pain, memory loss, bowel and6
bladder incontinence, nausea, skin rashes, headaches, and hair loss.
Gulf War veterans, however, are not the only ones who have
suffered from GWS; GWS symptoms have also spread to family
members of afflicted veterans. 7 The spread of the illness has become
so great that in April of 1996, the Pentagon completed a two-year,
$80 million study of GWS. s On December 13, 1994, the Department
of Defense (DOD) granted two Army Medical Centers a total of $20
million, collectively, for research into GWS. 9 In addition, on May
23, 1995, the Pentagon announced the award of a $5 million grant
program
to conduct research on the illness. 1o
Presently,
there is no evidence of a "single, disease-causing
agent"" of GWS. However, of the many possible causes, the follow4. Tina Adler, Desert Storm's Medical Quandary: Do Iraqi Chemical and Biological Agents Explain Gulf War Syndrome?, ScI. NEWS, June 18, 1994, at
394; Flanders, supra note 3, at 292; Gulf War Illnesses Linked To Pills, Insect
Repellents, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Apr. 10, 1995, at A4.
5. Laura Flanders, A Lingering Sickness, NATION, Jan. 23, 1995, at 94, 96; see
also Susan Duerksen, Two Gulf War Veterans Given Disability Checks, SAN
DIEo UNION-TRiBUNE, Apr. 27, 1995; Kevin O'Hanlon, Gulf War Vets Offer
Evidence Of Chemicals, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 13, 1995, at 14.
6. Adler, supra note 4, at 394; Gulf War Illnesses Linked To Pills, Insect Repellents,
supra note 4, at A4; Elliott J. Schuchardt, Walking a Thin Line: Distinguishing
Between Research and MedicalPracticeDuring OperationDesert Storm, 26 CoLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 77, 113 (1992); Martin Walker, Medicines Are Cited For Gulf
War Syndrome, MoNTREAL GAZETTE, Apr. 13, 1995, at B13.
7. Flanders, supra note 5, at 94, 96; Flanders, supra note 3, at 292, 293; David
France, The Families Who Are Dying For Our Country, REDBOOK, Sept. 1994,
at 114; Mystery Gulf War Syndrome to be Investigated Gulf Panel Appointed,
THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT AND THE LEDGER-STAR, Mar. 13, 1995, at A6 [hereinafter
Mystery]; Sarah Tippit, What's Wrong With Our Children?, LADIES Homm J.,
June 1994, at 100.
8. Scientists Report Duplicating Gulf War Syndrome, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL.
SERVICE, Apr. 19, 1996; Pentagon Finds No Gulf War Syndrome, PHOENIX
GAZETTE,

Apr. 3, 1996.

9. Flanders, supra note 5, at 94, 96. On Dec. 13, 1994, the Walter Reed Army
Medical Center and the Brook Army Medical Center were granted approximately $20 million collectively for GWS research. Id.
10. Pentagon Backs Gulf Ills Study, WASH. POST, May 24, 1995, at A23. Hospitals,
universities, and research institutions will receive portions of the award in order
to examine: (1) epidemiological studies on the health of veterans complaining
of GWS; (2) the effects of pyridostigmine bromide, when used by itself and
when used in combination with other chemicals to which Gulf War veterans
were exposed; and (3) clinical research to study specific GWS cases and the
possible transmission of GWS to family members. Id.
11. O'Hanlon, supra note 5, at 14; see Scientists Report Duplicating Gulf War
Syndrome, supra note 8.
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ing agents were listed as the most likely causes of the illness: (1) the
United States military's use of depleted uranium in artillery shells
and on the armor of tanks; (2) the two types of "investigational"
drugs that the DOD required Gulf War soldiers to take; and (3) the
destruction of Iraqi weapons arsenals, which were possibly stocked
with chemical and biological weapons. 2
This Comment first outlines the symptoms of GWS and discusses
the transmission of this illness to family members of veterans. Second,
this Comment explores the possible causes of GWS. Third, this
Comment discusses possible means of recovering monetary damages
and/or compensation from the United States by injured soldiers and
their families for GWS injuries. Finally, this Comment critiques and
analyzes the Feres3 doctrine, which precludes soldiers who served in
the Persian Gulf War from recovering damages under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for injuries incident to service.
II. SOLDIERS RETURN HOME WITH GULF WAR
SYNDROME
A.

Symptoms of Gulf War Syndrome

After returning home, at least 45,000 of the approximately
695,000 veterans who served in the Persian Gulf War noticed that
they were becoming il1 4 and that the severity of their symptoms were
increasing over time." Although Gulf War veterans complain of a
variety of different symptoms, many soldiers' illnesses share common

12. Flanders, supra note 3, at 292.
13. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
14. See Flanders, supra note 5, at 96; O'Hanlon, supra note 5, at 14; see also
Tippit, supra note 7, at 100 (reporting that in a 1994 Department of Veterans
Affairs Persian Gulf Family Support Program survey of 13,700 veterans, 71%
reported having physical problems which included symptoms of GWS).
In 84% of the cases involving soldiers who suffer from post-war ailments,
a clear diagnosis of health problems, such as an infectious disease or a
psychological problem, can be made. Chemical Agents Not Found In Gulf
War Ills, Pentagon Says, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1995, at A16; see O'Hanlon,
supra note 5, at 14 (stating that, in a study by microbiologist Howard Urnovitz,
approximately 85% of veterans showed signs of antibodies that can be activated
by exposure to radiation); Flanders, supra note 5, at 96 (stating that in a
recent, extensive study conducted by the DOD, of the 1000 soldiers studied,
85% have been dismissed as having symptoms such as skin rashes and respiratory problems, which the DOD states are "things that are not unexpected").
15. France, supra note 7, at 114; William Lowther, Mystery Illness and the Gulf
War: Ailing Veterans of the 1991 Campaign Demand Compensation, MAcLEAN's,
Aug. 23, 1993, at 32.
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characteristics. These debilitating symptoms have become commonly
referred to as Gulf War Syndrome.1 7 The most common symptoms
of GWS include: fatigue, skin rashes, nausea, headaches, body aches,
hair loss, respiratory problems, fever, blurred vision, low blood
pressure, neurological damage, and bowel and bladder incontinence. 8
A Journal of the American Medical Association study found that:
The most frequent subjective complaints [of veterans with
GWS] included joint pain (reported in 59% of the patients);
rash (56%); shortness of breath and chest pain (380%);
insomnia (37%); poor cognition (35%); fatigue (33%); and
intermittent diarrhea (30%). Veterans also reported nightmares (24%), hair loss (19%), night sweats (14%), cold

symptoms (11%), and bleeding gums

(7%).19

GWS drastically affects the lives of its victims. For example,
Carol Picou, once an active-duty Army nurse before serving in the
Gulf War, is now on seventy percent disability retirement from the
Army due to GWS. 20 Picou was in excellent health prior to serving
in the war. Since her return from the Persian Gulf, however, Picou
has been diagnosed with "depleted blood supplies reaching her left
thalamus gland and neurological damage to the left side of her brain
affecting her memory, vision and speech. ' ' 2' She also suffers from
respiratory problems, neck and facial rashes, abdominal distention,
regular fevers, and bowel and bladder incontinence, which require
catheterization and force her to wear diapers. 22 Picou's menstrual
period also comes in semi-monthly cycles, requiring continued usage
of menstrual flow protection. 23 One week her period is "black and
tarry, the next week clotted and profuse." 24

16. See Adler, supra note 4, at 394; Gulf War Illnesses Linked To Pills, Insect
Repellents, supra note 4, at A4; Lowther, supra note 15, at 32 ("Among the
most common symptoms of so-called Gulf War Syndrome are debilitating
fatigue, diarrhea, hair loss, bleeding gums, aching joints, bronchitis, sore throat
and rashes."); Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 113; Walker, supra note 6, at B13.
17. Adler, supra note 4, at 394.
18. See id.; Gulf War Illnesses Linked To Pills, Insect Repellents, supra note 4,
at A4; Lowther, supra note 15, at 32 ("Among the most common symptoms
of so-called Gulf War Syndrome are debilitating fatigue, diarrhea, hair loss,
bleeding gums, aching joints, bronchitis, sore throat and rashes."); Schuchardt,
supra note 6, at 113; Walker, supra note 6, at B13.
19. I. Boaz Milner et al., Is There a Gulf War Syndrome?, 271 JAMA 661, 661
(1994) (evaluating 166 Gulf War veterans).
20. Flanders, supra note 3, at 293.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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B.

Spread of Gulf War Syndrome to Family Members

1.

Transmission of Gulf War Syndrome to Soldiers' Spouses

After the veterans returned home, many soldiers' spouses began
to notice that they, too, were developing GWS symptoms. In 1994,
the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, chaired
by Senator Donald Riegle, conducted a study involving 1200 sick
male veterans. 25 The Committee found that "seventy-eight percent of
[the veterans'] wives had been affected [by GWS], as had [twentyfive] percent of children born to them before the war and [sixty-five]
percent born after." ' 26 After being reunited with their husbands, some
wives began to experience "terrible vaginal infections, cysts, blisters
and even bleeding sores." ' 27 These women have also complained that
their husbands' semen caused a burning sensation upon skin contact
during sexual intercourse. 28 According to former Senator Riegle: "The
increasing number of cases of spouses and children who report the
same symptoms as the veterans
indicates a strong possibility of the
' 29
transmissibility of [GWS]."
The Veterans Administration (VA), however, has denied that
any connection exists between the veterans' service in the Gulf War
and the ensuing development of GWS symptoms in their family
members.30 The VA stated that it has "found no clear-cut evidence
that [GWS] is being transmitted either casually or sexually."'" The
VA also stated that it was "'unable to detect any unifying diagnosis
or any unifying exposure' among the Gulf War veterans and their
32
families.''
2. Transmission of Gulf War Syndrome to Infants Conceived
After the War
GWS also appears to affect the unborn. Babies conceived by
veterans claiming to suffer from GWS "have been born with crippling
25. Flanders, supra note 5, at 96.
26. Id.

27. Id.; see France, supra note 7, at 114.
28. Flanders, supra note 5, at 96; France, supra note 7, at 114 (reporting that one
veteran's wife stated that her husband's semen caused her to have "soresblisters which actually open and bleed," and another veteran's spouse claimed
that her husband's semen caused her labia to crack and bleed).
29. Dennis Bernstein & Thea Kelley, Birth Defects, Illness Mark Sick Vets' Kids;
Gulf War Syndrome is Possibly Transmissible, NAT'L CATH. REP., Oct. 28,

1994, at 5.
30. Id.

31. France, supra note 7, at 114.
32. Bernstein and Kelley, supra note 29, at 5 (quoting VA report).
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birth defects, according to recent studies by Congress and independent
veterans' groups." 3 For example, by December of 1994, thirteen of
fifteen babies conceived by Gulf War veterans who had served in an
Army National Guard Company based in Waynesboro, Mississippi
were afflicted with such serious health ailments as respiratory problems, vomiting, diarrhea, high fevers, and blood disorders. 3 4 In two
extraordinary cases, one child was born with three nipples, and
another child was born with an enlarged liver."
Upon learning of the ailments affecting babies born to Waynesboro Army National Guard Unit veterans, the VA office in Jackson,
Mississippi conducted a statewide survey of 251 Gulf War veterans
and their children. The study revealed that sixty-seven percent of
children conceived after the war were "afflicted with illnesses rated
severe or ha[d] birth defects including missing eyes and ears, blood
infections, respiratory problems and fused fingers." '3 6 Other birth
defects afflicting these veterans' newborns included chronic skin
conditions, difficulty in sitting or swallowing, missing arms or hands,
and malformed brains.'Independent civilian studies have also shown tragically high rates
of birth defects in babies conceived by veterans after the Gulf War.
For example, Dr. Francis Waickman, an environmental pediatrician,
conducted a study that compared birth defect statistics of babies
conceived by Gulf War veterans following the war with those of
other babies.3" Dr. Waickman found "a 30 percent rate of abnormalities among the children of gulf veterans-'probably tenfold of
what is in the normal population."' 3 9
C.

Weighing the Evidence

Over 45,000 people have been afflicted with an extremely debilitating illness. 4° The tragically large number of birth defects in
children conceived by Gulf War veterans after the war presents
compelling evidence that GWS is neither a mere psychological problem afflicting soldiers nor a side-effect of post-traumatic stress dis-

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Flanders, supra note 3, at 293; Tippit, supra note 7, at 100.
Tippit, supra note 7, at 100.
Flanders, supra note 3, at 293 (reporting that the study revealed health problems
in 37 of the 55 babies born to veterans following the war (or 67%)); Tippit,
supra note 7, at 100.
Bernstein & Kelley, supra note 29, at 5.
Mystery, supra note 7, at A6.
Id.
Flanders, supra note 5, at 94, 96; see also Duerksen, supra note 5; O'Hanlon,
supra note 5, at 14.
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Studies reveal that many Gulf War veterans have symptoms
of various debilitating illnesses. 42 However, scientists still must determine: (1)the cause or causes of these ailments; (2) the extent of
their transmission; and (3) the means to treat and to prevent the
ailments. One would hope that scientists will not take twenty years
to make these determinations, as they did to conclude that Agent
43
Orange produced illnesses in Vietnam veterans.
III. EXPOSURE TO POSSIBLE CAUSES OF GULF WAR
SYNDROME
A.

In General

"What's known for now is that other members of the anti-Iraq
coalition in the [Gulf War] do not seem to have suffered from
unusual health problems." 44 This fact has led some scientists to
believe that GWS was caused by something to which only American
soldiers were exposed. Presently, however, "there is no concrete
evidence of a single, disease-causing agent ' 45 of GWS. According to
Veterans Affairs Secretary Jesse Brown: 'We don't know what's
wrong with them, but we do know they're sick." ' 4
Because soldiers were exposed to many environmental hazards
while in the Persian Gulf, determining the cause or causes of GWS
4
is particularly difficulty.
According to a 1992 study presented in the
Journal of the National Medical Association, soldiers in the Gulf
War were exposed to 'health hazards unparalleled in the history of
mankind.' ' 48 American veterans were "exposed to a 'toxic cocktail'
of deadly and mutagenic hazards, including uranium, chemical and
possibly biological warfare agents, pesticides, experimental drugs, oil
41. One theory posits that GWS is a psychological illness caused by the stress
veterans suffered while serving in the Persian Gulf. Charles T. Hinshaw Jr.,
Common Ailments Suggest a Pattern, INSIGHT, Apr. 18, 1994, at 20. In a study
conducted by the VA, however, 39 out of 42 Gulf War veterans with GWS
symptoms were found not to have "mood or anxiety disorders, including posttraumatic stress disorder." Id.
42. See, e.g., supra notes 4-6, 14-24 and accompanying text.
43. Mrs. Clinton Urges Thorough Probe of Gulf War Illnesses, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
15, 1995, at 10.
44. Dissecting a Medical Mystery, Federal Panel Will Seek Causes of Symptoms
Suffered by Thousands of Gulf War Veterans, Los ANGELES TiMEs, Mar. 13,
1995, at 4 [hereinafter Dissecting a Medical Mystery].

45. O'Hanlon, supra note 5, at 14; see Scientists Report Duplicating Gulf War
Syndrome, supra note 8.
46. Duerksen, supra note 5.
47. Dissecting a Medical Mystery, supra note 44, at 4.
48. France, supra note 7, at 114.
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smoke in the air, crude oil sprayed on the ground to keep the dust
down and crude-oil-contaminated shower water." ' 49 Congress found:
(1) During the Persian Gulf War, members of the Armed
Forces were exposed to numerous potentially toxic substances, including fumes and smoke from military operations,
oil well fires, diesel exhaust, paints, pesticides, depleted
uranium, infectious agents, investigational drugs and vaccines, and indigenous diseases, and were also given multiple
immunizations. It is not known whether [they] were exposed
to chemical or biological warfare agents. However, threats
of [such] warfare heightened the psychological stress associated with the military operation.
(2) Significant numbers of veterans of the Persian Gulf War
are suffering from illnesses, or are exhibiting symptoms of
illness, that cannot now be diagnosed or clearly defined. 0
Some researchers have reported that there is no single cause of
GWS. 5 ' Rather, they believe that a combination of hazards faced by
American troops during the Persian Gulf War caused the illness. For
example, in late April of 1994, an advisory panel, formed by the
National Institutes of Health, concluded that
the complex biological, chemical, physical, and psychological environment of the Southwest Asia theater of operations
produced complex adverse health effects in Persian Gulf
War veterans and that no single disease entity or syndrome
is apparent. Rather, it may be that the illnesses suffered by
those veterans result from multiple illnesses with overlapping
2
symptoms and causes that have yet to be defined .
49. Bernstein & Kelley, supra note 29, at 5; see also Flanders, supra note 3, at
292 (citing depleted uranium, experimental drugs, destruction of Iraqi weapons,
arsenals, and chemicals, and biological weapons as the greatest threats to
veterans' health).
50. Veterans' Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 103-446, 108 Stat. 4650 (codified at 38
U.S.C.A. § 1117 (West Supp. 1995)).
51. See Tippit, supra note 7, at 100 (stating that possible causes of GWS include
chemical and biological agents, parasites, smoke from burning oil wells, inoculations soldiers were required to take, or a combination of these factors).
Boaz Milner, M.D., a doctor with three board certificates, at the Allen Park,
Michigan VA hospital who has treated over 300 sick veterans, has identified
five different types of GWS. One type is the result of radiation; a second type
is due to experimental drugs soldiers were required to take; a third type is due
to environmental contaminants such as the soot produced from the hundreds
of burning oil wells; a fourth type is the result of exposure to chemicals
ranging from pesticides to nerve gas; and the fifth type is thought to be linked
to Iraq's biological weapons. France, supra note 7, at 114.
52. France, supra note 7, at 394 (noting that this panel reached its conclusion after
hearing testimony for two and a half days by military, health experts, and by
veterans).
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In addition, during the summer of 1995, the Pentagon reported that
its study of 10,020 veterans and their family members did not produce
evidence that GWS was attributable to one new mysterious illness. 3
The DOD concluded that a variety of ailments, such as tension
headache, depression, arthritis, and post-traumatic stress disorder,
caused what is commonly referred to as GWS.14 The Pentagon's
study, however,55 was scrutinized, and its results were, at first, labelled
"inadequate."
The DOD requested that the Institute of Medicine, a research
group affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences 5 6 study the
Pentagon's findings.17 After examining the study, the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine reported, in August of 1995,
that the "Defense Department had not adequately explained its
conclusion that the illnesses did not constitute a definable syndrome
unique to Persian Gulf Veterans. 58 In January of 1996, however,
the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine changed its
opinion regarding the Pentagon's findings. The January report issued
by the Institute of Medicine stated that the DOD's study was "compassionate and comprehensive." 5 9 In addition, the Institute of Medicine reported that upon further review, the data obtained from the
10,020 veterans provided no evidence of a ' 6"previously unknown,
serious illness among Persian Gulf veterans. 0
53. Mrs. Clinton Urges Thorough Probe of Gulf War Illnesses, supra note 43, at
10; Close Look At 'Gulf War Syndrome' Urged, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 15, 1995,
at 3A; Study of Vets Finds No Sign of Gulf War Syndrome, HERALD, Aug.
2, 1995, at 10A.
54. Study of Vets Finds No Sign of Gulf War Syndrome, supra note 53, at 10A;
Mrs. Clinton Urges Thorough Probe of Gulf War Illnesses, supra note 43, at
10; Close Look At 'Gulf War Syndrome' Urged, supra note 53, at 3A.
55. See Medical Experts Fault Pentagonfor Rejecting Gulf War Syndrome, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRmUNE,

Aug. 15, 1995, at A7.

56. Close Look At 'Gulf War Syndrome' Urged, supra note 53, at 3A.
57. Medical Experts Fault Pentagonfor Rejecting Gulf War Syndrome, supra note
56, at A7.
58. Close Look At 'Gulf War Syndrome' Urged, supra note 53, at 3A; 60 Minutes:
Gulf War Syndrome: Evidence Suggests Veteran Exposure to Chemical Weapons Despite Pentagon Assertion of No 'Widespread' Use (CBS, Inc. television
broadcast, Aug. 20, 1995) (transcript available in Westlaw, 60MIN database).
The Institute of Medicine report stated "the reasoning for [the Pentagon's
statement] is not well-explained, and the [Defense Department] states it as
though it were self-evident." Medical Experts Fault Pentagon for Rejecting
Gulf War Syndrome, supra note 56, at A7 (quoting the Institute of Medicine
report). The Institute of Medicine recommended that the Defense Department
"'either be more cautious in making this conclusion or justify it better."' Id.
59. David Brown, Gulf Vets' Treatment is Lauded; Panel Finds No Evidence of
Serious New Syndrome, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1996, at A19 (quoting National
Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine report).
60. Id.
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On April 2, 1996, the Pentagon released the results of an $80
million study on GWS. 6' The two-year study of approximately 18,900
Gulf War veterans showed that although many veterans had headaches, fatigue, memory loss, and depression, there was no single
cause behind these ailments, but, rather, a range of diagnoses existed. 62 The study revealed that eighteen percent of the patients
suffered from psychological ailments, eighteen percent had "musculoskeletal" ailments, eighteen percent had ailments with unknown
causes, a smaller percent had nervous system, skin, digestive system,
63
or respiratory system ailments, and ten percent were healthy.
Whether Gulf War veterans and their families suffer from one
mysterious illness or from several diagnosable ailments, the following
are among the agents listed as the most likely to cause GWS: (1) the
two types of "investigational" drugs that the DOD required Gulf
War soldiers to take; (2) the United States military's use of depleted
uranium in artillery shells and on the armor of tanks; and (3) the
destruction of Iraqi weapons arsenals, which may have been stocked
with chemical and biological weapons.6
B.

"Investigational" Drugs Soldiers Were Required to Take

During the Persian Gulf War, the DOD required American
soldiers to take two "investigational drugs" :65 pyridostigmine bromide
and pentavalent botulinum toxoid vaccine. 66 The drugs were made
by federal government contractors and were taken "as' 67 pre-treatment
antidotes to Iraqi chemical and biological weapons."
1.

Pyridostigmine Bromide

Since 1955, pyridostigmine bromide (pyridostigmine) has been
prescribed for "some rare autoimmune diseases involving faulty
transmission of nerve impulses to the muscles." 6 Prior to the Gulf
War, animal testing showed that taking pyridostigmine greatly in61. Scientists Report Duplicating Gulf War Syndrome, supra note 8; Pentagon
Finds No Gulf War Syndrome, supra note 8.
62. Id.; Study of 19,000 Finds No 'Gulf War Syndrome,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
1996.
63. Pentagon Finds No Gulf War Syndrome, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Apr. 3, 1996;
Report Won't Affect VA Treatment for Gulf Vets, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr.
5, 1996.
64. Flanders, supra note 3, at 292.
65. "Investigational drugs" are drugs that the Food and Drug Administration has
not approved for marketing to the general public. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(i) (1988).
66. Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 81.
67. Id. at 78.
68. Flanders, supra note 3, at 293.
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creased one's chances of surviving a lethal exposure to nerve agents 69
by increasing the effects of atropine and pralidoxime chloride, two
post-exposure nerve gas antidotes. 70 The Pentagon, therefore, requested that soldiers take this drug before combat to reduce the
harmful effects of nerve gas in case of attack. 7
Pyridostigmine, however, has severe side effects, including: watery eyes, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, increased salivation, sweating,
the urge to urinate, skin rashes, hair loss, weakness, and loss of
muscle control. 72 These side effects were experienced by some of the
American troops during the Persian Gulf War. For example, according to one Army nurse who served in the war: "Soon after taking
the [pyridostigmine], I couldn't control my eyes, nose and facial
muscles. I was overtaken with chronic sneezing, a running nose and
deltoid twitching. ' 73 The side effects
of pyridostigmine are similar
74
to the typical symptoms of GWS.
2.

Pentavalent Botulinum Toxoid Vaccine

Pentavalent botulinum toxoid vaccine (botulinum toxoid) was
the second investigational drug that the Pentagon required soldiers
to take. 75 Since 1966, over 4000 scientists and laboratory technicians
have taken this drug in order to prevent the contraction of botulism
poisoning from their lab work.76 Soldiers were vaccinated with this
drug in order to prevent botulism poisoning from biological weapons. 77
Botulinum toxoid, like pyridostigmine, produced side effects in
some of those soldiers who were vaccinated with it. 78 Approximately
five to seven percent of the approximately 4000 scientists and lab
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 103.
Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1372 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1372.
Flanders, supra note 3, at 293; Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 102.
Flanders, supra note 3, at 293. When Army nurse Carol Picou requested to
cease pyridostigmine treatment in order to regain control over her eyesight,
her request was denied and her local health officer demanded that she resume
taking the tablets. Id.
See Adler, supra note 4, at 394; Flanders, supra note 5, at 94 (stating that on
December 7, 1994, the outgoing chairman of the Senate Veterans Affairs
Committee, Jay Rockefeller, listed pyridostigmine as one of three medications
that may have caused GWS); Gulf War Illnesses Linked To Pills, Insect
Repellents, supra note 4, at A4; Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 113; Walker,
supra note 6, at B13.
The makers of botulinum toxoid did not seek FDA approval "simply because
of the limited market for the agent." Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 102.
Id.
Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1372 n.l.
See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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technicians who took the drug experienced some mild reactions,
usually in the form of redness of the skin.7 9 In rare cases, those
scientists and lab technicians who were vaccinated with
the drug had
80
sore joints, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, and fever.
3. Jhe Effects of the Combination of Investigational Drugs,
Insecticides, and Pesticides Used by American Servicemen During
the Gulf War
Chlorpyrifos, an insecticide sold under the trade name Dursban,
was used by American troops during the Persian Gulf War. 81 A team
of Duke University researchers has found that nervous-system damage
occurs in chickens that are exposed to combinations of chlorpyrifos
and pyridostigmine.8 2 Additionally, the Duke team found that the
same toxic effects on the chickens' nervous system occurred when
chlorpyrifos was used in combination with two other pesticides,
permethrin and N,N-diethyl-m-toluamide (DEET), which were both
used by American soldiers during the Gulf War to protect them from
3
insects in the desert and from the diseases that those insects carried.1
Testing showed that these chemicals, when used individually, did not
produce the toxic symptoms in the chickens that they produced when
used in combination.84
During the course of the experiments, the chickens were first
exposed to pyridostigmine.85 Next, the chickens were exposed to
various combinations of the insecticides used by American troops in
the Gulf War. 6 The chemical combinations reduced the activity of
neurotoxic esterase, an enzyme found in brain tissue.8 7 Each combination resulted in nerve damage or in symptoms common to GWS. 8s
The results obtained from this research have been confirmed.
First, through preliminary studies, the Duke team discovered "a
certain profile among the blood samples from veterans that is consistent with [the team's] research that animals' exposure to multiple

79. Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 102.

80. Id.
81. Gulf War Studies Cast Doubt On Common Bug-killer, THE VIRGN A-PrLOT
AND THE LEDGER-STAR, Apr. 17, 1995, at B2.

82. Id. The Environmental Protection Agency is presently conducting its own study
on the effects of chlorpyrifos, fearing that, by itself, the pesticide may injure
people. Id.
83. Id.; see Scientists Report Duplicating Gulf War Syndrome, supra note 8.
84. Scientists Report Duplicating Gulf War Syndrome, supra note 8; Chemical
Combo May Be Linked To 'Gulf Syndrome,' CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 1996.
85. Walker, supra note 6, at B13.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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damage." 8 9

chemicals results in central nervous-system
Second, a
Duke researcher, a toxicologist at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, and a Kansas State toxicology professor,
together, conducted a separate study on the effects of combinations
of DEET, permethrin, and pyridostigmine bromide on chickens. 90 In
mid-April of 1996, this study revealed that the combination of the
three chemicals in chickens produced many of the symptoms reported
by Gulf War veterans. 9l When the chickens were exposed to any two
combinations of the chemicals, they developed such symptoms as
shortness of breath, weight loss, tremors, and staggering. 92 In addition, some chickens that were exposed to the combination of all three
chemicals died or were paralyzed. 93 Third, the Pentagon confirmed
the findings of the Duke University study through its own testing of
rats and hens. 94
When exposed to chemicals, the human nervous system responds
in a manner similar to that of chickens. 95 Therefore, the same
nervous-system damage that resulted in the chickens is likely to have
occurred in the Gulf War veterans who took pyridostigmine and who
were also exposed to chlorpyrifos, permethrin, or DEET. 96 As a
result, some scientists hypothesize that the exposure of Gulf War
veterans to combinations of pyridostigmine, herbicides, and insecticides used during the Gulf War is one of the most likely causes of
GWS. 97 For now, however, this theory is based solely on preliminary
data obtained from animals. 9
C. Inhalation of Smoke From Burning Oil Wells
Approximately 700 burning oil wells are thought to have emitted
5000 tons of dense smoke each day while American soldiers were
89. Id. (quoting Mohamed Abou-Donia, a member of the Duke University research
team).
90. Scientists Report Duplicating Gulf War Syndrome, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL.
SERVICE, Apr. 19, 1996; Chemical Combo May Be Linked To 'Gulf Syndrome,'
91.
92.
93.
94.

supra note 84.
Scientists Report Duplicating Gulf War Syndrome, supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Tinker Ready, Duke Research Suggests Cause for Gulf Illness, NEWS &
OBSERVER, Apr. 11, 1995, at Al; Scientists Report Duplicating Gulf War
Syndrome, supra note 8. The Pentagon stated that "[p]reliminary results
indicate that, in rats, the combination of the anti-nerve gas drug with insecticides is more toxic than when the chemicals are used separately." Walker,
supra note 6, at B13.

95. Tinker Ready, Scientist Works to Solve Puzzle of Gulf War Illness, News &
Observer, Apr. 16, 1995, at 1I.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.

19961

Gulf War Syndrome

fighting in the Gulf War. 99 Inhalation of soot emitted from the
burning oil wells is thought to be one of the causes of GWS. 1°° The
American Academy of Environmental Medicine has hypothesized that
GWS is caused by "multiple factors encountered by our armed forces
in the Persian Gulf region and that the chief inciting factor was
exposure to hydrocarbons from burning oil wells and spilled crude
oil.''

101

There is, however, strong evidence showing that the inhalation
of soot from the burning wells does not cause GWS. In the summer
of 1992, the United States Army Environmental Hygiene Agency
reported that, based upon its testing of ground and soil samples from
various areas of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Persian Gulf air
during the spring and summer of 1991 "was about as dirty as that
of Houston and Philadelphia."' ' 0 2 In addition, American civilian
workers who helped to extinguish the oil fires in Kuwait have
experienced very few GWS symptoms.0 3 Of the 400 civilian men who
worked as firefighters in Kuwait, only two have died.) 4 One man
died of a brain tumor and the other man died of lung cancer, diseases
that doctors cannot definitely link to the firefighting. 0° No other
workers have reported symptoms consistent with GWS.' 6
The small number of American civilian firefighters now displaying symptoms of GWS indicates that the inhalation of soot from the
fires did not cause the illness. Instead, these statistics imply that
GWS is caused by something else - to which the soldiers were
exposed but the civilians were not. For example, the firefighters were
not injected with the same inoculations as the soldiers. 07 The fact
that the civilians were not inoculated points, once again, to the theory
that GWS was in some way caused by the investigational drugs that
the soldiers were required to take. 08
D. Leishmaniasis
Leishmaniasis is also listed as a possible cause of GWS. Leishmaniasis is "a parasitic infection that enters the bloodstream through
99. France, supra note 7, at 114; Hinshaw, supra note 41, at 20; see also David
Brown, The Searchfor Causes Series: Diagnosis Unknown: Gulf War Syndrome
Series, WASH. PosT, July 24, 1994, at A19 ("The army of Iraq ignited 605 oil
wells and uncapped 46 others as it fled Kuwait in February, 1991.").
100. France, supra note 7, at 114.
101. Hinshaw, supra note 41, at 20.
102. Brown, supra note 99, at A19.
103. Dick Foster, Oil-field Firefighters in Iraq Didn't Get Il, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS,

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Apr. 2, 1995, at 14A.
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By September of 1994, only thirty-one cases of
sand fly bites."'
Leishmaniasis had been diagnosed in Gulf War veterans. 10 However,
based on the infection rate of this disease which ranged from twentyone to forty-three percent of all Gulf War veterans,"' the Pentagon,
in November of 1991, banned blood donations from veterans of the
Gulf War. ' 2 The ban was lifted in January of 1993, after test results3
showed that few Gulf War veterans had the parasitic infection."
While the infection has not been found in many Gulf War veterans,4
tens of thousands of veterans have displayed GWS symptoms."
Thus, Leishmaniasis is probably not one of the causes of GWS.
E.

Depleted Uranium

Depleted uranium releases radioactive uranium oxide particles
upon impact." 5 Additionally, radiation experts state that depleted
uranium "burns at extreme temperatures and creates an oxide dust
that can be easily inhaled and ingested.1" 6 The Pentagon used
depleted uranium to coat artillery shells to enable the shells to "smash
through armor plate.""1'7 Depleted uranium was also used on the
armor of American tanks during the war to protect them from enemy
fire." ' Therefore, when soldiers were in the vicinity of shells from
American artillery that hit their targets, or when soldiers were near
American tanks which were hit by enemy fire, the troops could have
inhaled radioactive uranium oxide particles. The inhaled particles
could possibly have caused their GWS. 119
Soldiers who came in contact with the depleted uranium soon
began to show signs of GWS. For example, Sergeant Carol Picou
was an active-duty Army nurse who, along with her squad, set up
109. David Brown, ParasiteProteins May Help Track a Disease to its Origin, WASH.
POST, Oct. 2, 1995, at A3; France, supra note 7, at 114.
110. France, supra note 7, at 114.
111. Id.
112. Flanders, supra note 3, at 293.
113. Id.
114. Brown, supra note 109, at A3; France, supra note 7, at 114. One possible
reason for the relatively few cases of diagnosed leishmaniasis in Gulf War
veterans, however, could be the result of the impracticality of testing thousands
of veterans for the disease. "The only test with a good chance of finding
[leishmaniasis] requires the removal of cells from the bone marrow, a painful
and moderately expensive procedure." France, supra note 7, at 114.
115. Lowther, supra note 15, at 32.
116. Flanders, supra note 3, at 293.
117. Lowther, supra note 15, at 32.
118. Id. This author is unaware whether the source of the depleted uranium came
from a federal government contractor, or whether it was supplied directly to
the military by the United States.
119. Flanders, supra note 3, at 293.
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camp two miles away from a battlefield contaminated by the depleted
uranium shells fired by American tanks and helicopters. 120 After
several weeks, Picou had lost all urinary control, could not keep
food down, and "was passing black, tarry stools that Army doctors
attributed to 'drinking too much water' and the change in diet."''
The theory that depleted uranium is a cause of GWS is further
supported by the fact that many of the birth defects found in the
children of Gulf War veterans "would be consistent with the effects
22
of radiation from depleted uranium." 1
F.

Exposure to Chemical and Biological Agents

During the war, Iraq had many chemical weapons 123 in its
possession. 124 Presently, various United States agencies claim that
25
none of these chemical weapons were used in the Persian Gulf War. 1
The DOD h4s taken the position that there is no proof, either
classified or unclassified, that Gulf War veterans were exposed to
Iraqi chemical and biological agents. 126 In a 60 Minutes interview
that aired on March 12, 1995, then Deputy Secretary of Defense
John Deutch 27 stated: "To my knowledge, we have no confirmation
of any soldier having actually been injured by any chemical agent

120.
121.
122.
123.

Flanders, supra note 5, at 96.
Flanders, supra note 3, at 293.
Id.
Chemical weapons are typically used to "annihilate unequipped adversary
populations without harming roads, buildings, or physical infrastructure."
Barry Kellman, Bridling the International Trade of Catastrophic Weaponry,

43 Am. U. L. REv. 755, 763 (1994). Nerve agents comprise the most common
form of chemical weapons. Id. at 762.
124. Adler, supra note 4, at 394 (stating that CIA agent Gordon Oehler testified
before a Senate hearing that "United Nations inspectors found 5,000 tons of
[Iraqi] stockpiled chemical agents and more than 46,000 filled munitions,
including 30 missile warheads, bombs filled with mustard gas, and nerve gas
containers").
125. 60 Minutes: Gulf War Syndrome (CBS, Inc. television broadcast, Mar. 12,

1995) (transcript available in Westlaw, 60MIN database) [hereinafter 60 Minutes]; David Brown, No Evidence Chemical Weapons Used in Gulf War, Panel
Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at A6; Brown, supra note 99, at A19;
O'Hanlon, supra note 5, at 14; Robert Burns, CIA Hunts for Evidence on
Gulf War Syndrome, FREsNo BEE, Apr. 26, 1995, at A9.

126. Id.; O'Hanlon, supra note 5, at 14 (reporting that in May 1994, a DOD
memorandum stated: "There is no information, classified or unclassified, that
indicates that chemical or biological weapons were used in the Persian Gulf").
Biological weapons are comprised of "living organisms that infect attacked
victims, causing disease, incapacitation, and often death." Kellman, supra note
123, at 763. The military uses both biological and chemical weapons to kill
the enemy without destroying the infrastructure of the area attacked. Id.
127. John Deutch is presently the Director of the CIA.
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during the Gulf War."'' 21 Mr. Deutch also stated: "I am quite sure
that there were no findings of chemical agents - Iraqi chemical
agents or anyone else's chemical agents - south of Basra in' 29
the area
where U.S. troops and other allied troops were deployed.'

The DOD is not the only federal agency to deny that Iraq used
chemical and biological weapons during the Gulf War. Dr. Steven
Joseph, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, informed the House Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee that test results
have shown that biological and chemical agents were not the cause
of the many veterans' ailments. 3 0 Additionally, on January 4, 1995,
a panel appointed by the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of
Medicine comprised primarily of physicians, epidemiologists, and
environmental health specialists, reported that no evidence exists that
either biological or chemical weapons were used against American
soldiers during the Gulf War. 3 ' The panel also stated that GWS was
not "the result of chemical, biological, or toxin warfare,
or accidental
' 2
material.'
research
or
weapons
stored
to
exposures
Because of their own experiences, many veterans do not believe
the statements made by these federal agencies. During the Gulf War,
tens of thousands of chemical alarms sounded, indicating the presence
of chemical weapons in the area. 3 Many of the chemical sensors
sounded alarms, signaling that the deadly chemical nerve agent sarin
had reached a level one 4thousand times over the level considered
13
hazardous by the Army.

The Pentagon's official answer was that every one of the chemical alarms that sounded was a false alarm.'35 Former Senator Donald
Riegle, who led hearings on GWS, agrees with the veterans who
believe that military leaders were mistaken when they said that
36
veterans were not exposed to chemical weapons in the Gulf War.
Senator Riegle stated that the Pentagon's answer was "totally un7
believable.'1

On March 12, 1995, Gulf War veterans presented recently declassified DOD documents that "refute[] the federal government's
assertion that [the veterans] were not exposed to chemical and biological agents during the [Gulf War]."'3 The document revealed a
128.
129.
130.
131.

60 Minutes, supra note 125.
Id.
Dissecting a Medical Mystery, supra note 44, at 4.
Brown, supra note 125, at A6.

132. Id.

133.
134.
135.
136.

60 Minutes, supra note 125.
Adler, supra note 4, at 394.
Id.
60 Minutes, supra note 125; Daniel Williams, U.S. Hides Evidence of Gulf
Chemical Arms, Senator Says,

137. 60 Minutes, supra note 125.
138. O'Hanlon, supra note 5, at 14.

WASH. POST,

Oct. 9, 1994, at A48.
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January 20, 1991, Operation Desert Storm command log entry which
stated that "Czechoslovakian troops had detected chemical agents
'flowing down from [a] factory/storage [facility that had been]
bombed in Iraq." ' 9 A Czechoslovakian team also spotted "borderline life-threatening concentrations of the chemical agents" near
American troops, according to a Senate Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Committee report.'14 The Pentagon's Edwin Dorn told
the Senate committee: "We have
. . . accepted those [Czech] detec' 4
tions as likely valid detections.'

Furthermore, at the Gulf War Veterans' Conference of March
12, 1995, microbiologist Howard Urnovitz "presented findings [that]
suggest ... chemical and biological agents may be causing [GWS]."142
Urnovitz stated that in a study of forty Gulf War veterans, eightyfive percent "showed signs of antibodies that normally appear when
a substance in the body know[n] as HERVs is activated."'' 43 According to Urnovitz, the causes of HERV activation include radiation
and/or exposure to toxins.'"
In mid-March of 1995, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
began to review data concerning the possibility of United States
soldiers' exposure to chemical or biological agents during the Persian
Gulf War. 145 As of late April of 1995, the CIA had found no evidence
that such exposure
had ever occurred.'" The study, however, is not
47
yet complete.

139. Id.; 60 Minutes, supra note 125. A group of veterans stated that the chemical
alarms were real. 60 Minutes, supra note 125. The soldiers claim they were
called to MOPP 4, which required them to put on all chemical and biological
protective gear, over a radio broadcast which stated that chemicals were in the
area. Id. The soldiers further stated that all exposed skin felt like it was on
fire and that three to four days following the attack, they had symptoms which
included burning skin, a numb face, rashes, and night sweats. Id. Logs show
that on this night there was an unconfirmed report of a chemical attack. Id.
A Czechoslovakian chemical team located several hundred miles away detected
a deadly nerve agent, sarin, in the air. Id. At a briefing on Nov. 10, 1993,
then Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch said the Czech findings were
believed to be valid. During the 60 Minutes interview, however, Deutch claimed
the Czech report was presently not believed to be accurate, and that the Czechs
actually detected a contaminant instead of sarin. Id.
140. Adler, supra note 4, at 395.
141. Id. The Czechoslovakian report cannot be confirmed, however, because no
samples were saved. Brown, supra note 99, at A19.
142. O'Hanlon, supra note 5, at 14.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Robert Burns, CIA Studying Gulf War Data on Iraqi Chemical Weapons,
FREsNo BEE, Apr. 26, 1995, at A9.
146. CIA Hunts For Evidence on Gulf War Syndrome, STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 26,
1995, (page unavailable online).
147. Id.
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Determining whether chemical or biological agents were used by
Iraq against United States military personnel during the Gulf War
could be crucial to determining whether GWS was caused by exposure
to these weapons. Military research shows that low-level doses of the
chemical nerve agent sarin cause symptoms, such as headaches,
nausea, and weakness, that are virtually identical to those symptoms
found in veterans who have GWS.' 48
IV.

COMPENSATION FOR GULF WAR SYNDROME

Regardless of the cause, an issue of tremendous importance to
injured veterans is whether they may be compensated for their GWS.
In order to receive compensation from the United States, those
afflicted with GWS must show that the United States has waived its
49
sovereign immunity from suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act.'
A.

The Government's Sovereign Immunity In General

The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it is known today,
originated in England, where, under the theory that the King could
do no wrong, the Crown was immune from any suit to which it did
not consent. 5 0 This philosophy has remained in effect in the United
States as well, "partly on the ground that it seem[s] illogical to
enforce a claim against the very authority that create[s] the claim in
the first place."' 51 The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the
federal government from liability for tortious acts committed
by its
52
agents or employees, unless it agrees to be held liable.'
B.

The Federal Tort Claims Act

53
In 1948, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).'
The FTCA "mark[ed] the culmination of a long effort to mitigate

148. 60 Minutes, supra note 125.

149. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
150. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950); W. PAGE PROSSER ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§. 131,

at 1033 (5th ed. 1984).

151. KEETON, supra note 150, at 1033.
152. Id.
153. 28 U.S.C.

Title 28,

§ 2674 (1988). Several of the provisions of the FTCA are found in

§§ 2674 (United States is liable in same manner and to same extent

as a private individual would be), 1291 (the federal courts of appeals have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of federal district courts), 1346(b)

(federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction of civil claims against the
United States Government for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or
death caused by a federal government employee's negligent or wrongful act or
omission while acting in the scope of employment), 1402(b) (in any section
1346(b) action, only the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides or the

19961

Gulf War Syndrome

unjust consequences of sovereign immunity from suit."' 5 4 The FTCA
partially waives the federal government's immunity from tort liability;
section 2674 states that "[the United States shall be liable . . . in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances. . .. "I" Additionally, section 1346(b) of the FTCA,
in essence, creates a qualified consent by the United States to be
sued based on tort liability. Section 1346(b) provides that the federal
district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil claims against the
United States for
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting . . . under circumstances where the United States, if
a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission

occurred .16
Section 2671 of the FTCA states that members of the military
or naval forces of the United States are federal government employees. 5 7 Additionally, section 2671 states that, for a member of the
Armed Services, "acting within the scope of his office or employment" means "acting in the line of duty."'' 8 Therefore, by applying
section 2671 of the FTCA to section 1346(b) of the FTCA, it would
appear that a qualified consent to be sued for tort liability is provided
by the federal government when a soldier commits a tort in the line
of duty. The FTCA provides exceptions to section 2674, however, in
which its sovereign immunity is not waived. 5 9
1. Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act That May Bar
Recovery in Gulf War Syndrome Actions
If a claim falls within one of the exceptions to section 2674, the
federal government's sovereign immunity is not waived, and federal
district courts do not have jurisdiction under the FTCA to hear the

district where the cause of action arose may try the case), 1502 (United States
Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims arising out of
treaties with foreign governments), 2401(b) (suit must be filed in every tort
claim against the United States within two years after the claim accrues or else
the claim is barred), 2402 (tort claims shall not be tried by a jury), 2412(b)
(awarding costs and attorneys fees to prevailing party in suits against the United
States), and 2671-2680 (tort claims procedure).
154. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
156. Id. § 1346(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
157. Id. § 2671.
158. Id.
159. These exceptions may be found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988).

200
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case.1 0 There are three primary exceptions to section 2674 which
may allow the United States to claim sovereign immunity if sued by
veterans and their family members for their GWS.
First, section 2680(a), known as the "discretionary function
exception," ' 16' excepts "[any claim . . . based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of62
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 1
The "military departments" of the United States are considered to
be federal agencies under the FTCA. 63 Therefore, the United States
can argue that it may not be sued for veterans' GWS if GWS is
caused by the investigational drugs the soldiers were required to take
during the war or if it is due to the military's use of depleted uranium
in artillery shells.
In support, the United States may claim that both requiring
soldiers to take investigational drugs and coating artillery shells and
tanks with depleted uranium involved discretionary decisions in the
exercise of the military's duty to protect the lives of its soldiers. As
is necessary in order to fall within the discretionary function exception, each of these decisions was made solely by agencies or employees
of the federal government. The decision to require soldiers to take
the investigational drugs was made by the Pentagon. The Pentagon
required all soldiers to take pyridostigmine and botulinum toxoid
after concluding that the military mission in the Gulf War would
have been jeopardized if soldiers were given the choice whether to
take the two drugs. 164 The Pentagon was able to require the soldiers
to take the drugs because the FDA Commissioner concluded that the
informed consent of the soldiers was not feasible
for these specific
65
investigational drugs during the Gulf War.

In addition, the coating of artillery shells and tanks with depleted
uranium will likely be deemed by the courts to have been a discretionary function of the United States. The United States Supreme
Court has stated that selecting "the appropriate design for military
equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretion-

160. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976); Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 30-31 (1953).

161. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 769 (E.D.N.Y.
1980), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Agent Orange].
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
163. Id. § 2671.
164. Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 80.
165. Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 938 F.2d 1370, 1374 (D.C.

Cir. 1991); Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 79 (citing Judy Foreman, Ethicists
Assail a Plan to Give Troops Unapproved Vaccine, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9,
1991, at 10).
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ary function within the meaning of [section 2680 of the FTCA]." 66
Second, section 26800) of the FTCA, known as the "combatant
exception, 1 ' 67 excepts from the FTCA "[any claim arising out of
the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast
Guard, during time of war." 168 Congress has declared that the Persian
Gulf War was a "period of war.' ' 69 It appears from the plain
language of this exception that the United States can claim sovereign
immunity from liability for veterans' GWS because GWS arose out
of the combatant activities of the Persian Gulf War.
Third, section 2680(k), referred to as the "foreign country
exception,' ' 70 excepts "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country."''
The purpose of the "foreign country exception" is to ensure that
"the United States [is not subject] to liabilities dependent upon the
laws of a foreign power.' 1 72 Therefore, the United States may not
successfully claim that a suit is barred under section 2680(k) of the
FTCA in any GWS cases as long as the party suing does not contend
that foreign law should be applied.
These FTCA exceptions are merely the first hurdle that veterans
must overcome in order to bring suit against the federal government.
Even if claims for tort liability against the United States for veterans'
GWS are not barred by any of these exceptions, the claims may,
nevertheless, be barred by the Feres 73 doctrine.
C.

The "Feres" Doctrine and Its Progeny

1. Feres v. United States
The United States Supreme Court has shown through its holdings
in several cases that courts should not apply the FTCA to claims
166.
167.
168.
169.

170.
171.
172.
173.

Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 769.
28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1988) (emphasis added).
38 U.S.C. § 101(11) (Supp. V 1993).
The term "period of war" means the Spanish-American War, the
Mexican border period, World War I, World War II, the Korean
conflict, the Vietnam era, the Persian Gulf War, and the period
beginning on the date of any future declaration of war by the Congress
and ending on the date prescribed by Presidential proclamation or
concurrent resolution of the Congress.
Id.
Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 769.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1988).
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (quoting Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (Jan. 29, 1942)).
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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arising out of the relationship between soldiers and the military.174
In the landmark case, Feres v. United States,' the Supreme Court
strictly interpreted the FTCA to preclude recovery of damages from
the federal government under the FTCA for "injuries to servicemen
where the injuries ar[ose] out of or [welre in the course of activity

incident to service. ''176 This holding is commonly referred to as the
"Feres doctrine." This doctrine creates an insurmountable hurdle
that soldiers and their families presently face in their attempts to
recover monetary damages from the United States under the FTCA.
In Feres, the Court consolidated three cases for review. The first
of the cases was Feres v. United States. 77 In that case, a United
States Army soldier on active duty died as a result of a fire in his
barracks.17s The soldier's widow sued the federal government for
negligently quartering her husband in barracks that the Army knew
or should have known were unsafe owing to a defective
heating plant
179
and for failing to maintain a sufficient fire watch.
The second of the three consolidated cases was Jefferson v.
United States. s0 The plaintiff in Jefferson was a former Army soldier
who required abdominal surgery while on active duty.' 8 ' Eight months
after his discharge, the plaintiff had a towel measuring thirty inches
in length and eighteen inches in width removed from his stomach.8 2
The towel had the phrase "Medical Department U.S. Army" inscribed on it. 183 Jefferson alleged that the surgeon who performed
his original abdominal surgery negligently left the towel in his stomach.'14
The third case that was consolidated in Feres was United States
v. Griggs.'85 Griggs's executrix alleged that Griggs died while on
active military duty as a result1 of "negligent and unskillful medical

treatment by Army surgeons.1"16

174. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S.
1 (1973); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

340 U.S. 135 (1950).
Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
Id.
178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950).
181. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 518-19 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub
nom., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
182. Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'd sub nom., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.

135 (1950).
186. Feres, 340 U.S. at 137.
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In all three cases, an active duty soldier had "sustained injury
due to negligence of others in the armed forces."'18 7 The common
issue, therefore, was "whether the [FTCA] extend[ed] its remedy to
one sustaining 'incident to the service' what under other circumstances
would be an actionable wrong."'' 88 Based primarily on four different
theories, the Supreme Court determined that the FTCA did not waive
the sovereign immunity of the United States for injuries to active
duty soldiers incurred incident to military service. 89
First, the Court noted that the language of the FTCA indicated
that Congress intended only to waive the federal government's sovereign immunity where an analogous private liability existed.' 90 The
Court stated that the FTCA's effect was "to waive immunity from
recognized causes of action and was not to visit the Government
with novel and unprecedented liabilities.' ' 9' Because no American
law in existence allowed soldiers to recover damages caused by the
negligence of their superior officers or the federal government, 92 the
Court ruled that the FTCA did not allow soldiers to recover for
injuries incident to service. 9 The Supreme Court opined that to hold
otherwise would be to provide new causes of action against the
United States which, the Court determined, was not Congress's
intention. 194
A second rationale for the Feres Court's holding was the lifestyle
of the soldier. Soldiers often are transferred to different bases
throughout the United States and its territories and possessions. 95
Under the FTCA, the federal government's liability is determined
pursuant to "the law of the place where the act or omission [of the
government employee] occurred."' 96 Therefore, under the FTCA,
suits by soldiers would be governed by the law of the state in which
the injury took place. 97 Many states have completely different laws

187.
188.
189.
190.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 138.
Id.
Id. at 141-45.
Id. at 141. FTCA § 2674 states that "[tlhe United States shall be liable ...
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988). The Court construed § 2674 as solely
providing "acceptance of liability under circumstances that would bring private
liability into existence." Feres, 340 U.S. at 141.
Feres, 340 U.S. at 142.
The Court stated it knew of "no American law which ever ha[d] permitted a
soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the
Government he is serving." Id. at 141.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 142 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)).
Id. at 143-44.

204 '
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regarding an employer's liability for injuries to its employee, such as
workman's compensation, common law actions for damages between
employer and employee, limitations of liability, and doctrines of
assumption of risk. 9 Additionally, a soldier who was injured in the
state where he was stationed and who was transferred to a base in
another state or country during the suit would encounter extraordinary problems - such as dealing with witness procurement, time,
and expense - during the litigation that would not be experienced
by civilians.' 99 The Court, in Feres, stated that it was unreasonable
that the location of a soldier's injury would determine the law to be
applied to a soldier's tort claim, especially when the soldier had no
choice but to go where ordered by the federal government. 200 Therefore, the Court
concluded that soldiers were barred from suing under
20 1
the FTCA.
The Court's third rationale for barring suits by soldiers against
the United States under the FTCA was that the relationship between
the soldier and the armed forces was "distinctively federal in character. 202 The Court noted that liability arising out of this relationship
should be "fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed
by federal authority." 20 3 The Court noted that there was no federal
law which provided for the recovery that the plaintiffs in the three
cases sought. 204 Therefore, because Congress had never subjected this
distinctively federal relationship to state law, the Court reasoned that
Congress did not intend for the FTCA to be applicable in suits
against the United States, by soldiers injured incident to service. 20 5
Finally, the Feres Court noted the existence of the Veterans'
Benefits Act (VBA), 206 which provides a no-fault-based scheme to
compensate veterans for service-connected and non-service-connected
disabilities and which compensates the veterans' families for serviceconnected and non-service-connected deaths of veterans. 20 7 The Court
reasoned that if Congress had intended to permit soldiers to recover
under the FTCA, Congress would have created a provision in the
FTCA explaining how recovery under the FTCA and compensation

198. Id. at 143.
199. Id. at 145.

200. Id. at 143. The Court stated "[tihat the geography of an injury should select
the law to be applied to [a soldier's] tort claims makes no sense." Id.
201. Id. at 146.
202. Id. at 143 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305

(1947)).
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 144 (quoting Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. at 305-06).
Id.
Id.
38 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1701 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
See id.
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under the VBA offset each other. 20 Because no such provision
existed, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend for the
FTCA to establish federal governmental liability for injuries to service
members arising out of or during the course of "activity incident to
service. 209
Based on these four rationales, the Feres Court concluded that
Congress did not intend for the FTCA to allow service members to
recover from the United States under tort liability for service-related
injuries or death. 210 The Court stated, however: "[I]f we misinterpret
' 2 11
the [FTCA], at least Congress possesses a ready remedy."
2.

United States v. Brown

Four years later, in United States v. Brown, the Supreme Court
allowed a plaintiff to recover from a VA hospital by distinguishing
Feres.212 In Brown, the plaintiff had injured his knee while on active
duty in the Armed Services and was honorably discharged as a result
of the injury. 2 13 Six years after the discharge, the plaintiff had knee
surgery at a VA hospital.2 14 Following the operation, the plaintiff's
knee continued to dislocate, requiring a second operation one year
after the first operation had been performed. 215 The second surgery
was also performed at a VA hospital. 21 6 During the second surgery,
an allegedly defective tourniquet was217used, which resulted in permanent nerve damage to Brown's leg.
Brown filed suit for damages under the FTCA, claiming that he
suffered injury due to the VA hospital's negligent treatment of his
knee. 218 The Brown Court noted that the Feres decision was based
on the "peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and
the extreme results that might [be] obtain[ed] if suits under the
[FTCA] were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts
committed in the course of military duty. ' 21 9 Because the actual nerve
damage occurred after Brown was discharged from the Armed Services, the Court held that Brown's suit would not affect the special

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950).
Id. at 144-46.
Id. at 146.
Id.at 138.
348 U.S. 110 (1954).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 110-11.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 112 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-43 (1950)).
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relationship of a soldier to his superiors and, therefore, that the suit
was not barred by Feres.220 The Brown Court adhered to the "line
drawn in the Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that
'22
did not arise out of or in the course of military duty." 1
The Court also recalled that the Feres opinion stated that the
FTCA waived federal government immunity from recognized causes
of action. 222 A hospital's liability for negligence to its patients was a
recognized cause of action under local laws concerning private parties. 223 Therefore, the Court held that the FTCA
waived the federal
224
government's sovereign immunity in Brown.
3.

Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States

The next United States Supreme Court case that dealt explicitly
with recovery against the federal government under the FTCA for
injuries sustained by soldiers during the course of duty was Stencel
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States.225 In Stencel, a National
Guard Officer, Captain John Donham, sustained injuries when the
ejection system of his fighter aircraft malfunctioned during a midair emergency. 226 Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation (Stencel)
manufactured the ejection system with some parts provided by the
United States and according to the United States Government's
specifications. Captain Donham sued both the United States (under
the FTCA) and Stencel, alleging that their individual and joint
negligence caused the ejection system's malfunction. 227 Stencel crossclaimed against the United States (under the FTCA) for indemnification, claiming that any malfunctions were caused by the faulty
components provided,
and the faulty specifications required, by the
228
United States.
The Court looked to Feres and stated: "The relationship between
the Government and its suppliers of ordnance is certainly no less
'distinctively federal in character' than the relationship between the
Government and its soldiers." 229 Therefore, the Stencel Court found
that the distinctively federal relationship between the United States
and its supplier of ordnance would make the application of state law
to determine liability pursuant to FTCA section 1346(b) inappropri220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 113.
Id.
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 113.
Id.
431 U.S. 666 (1977).
Id. at 667.
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id. at 672.
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As a result, Stencel's cross-claim against the United States for

for any recovery Donham might receive from Stencel
indemnification
23
was barred.

In addition, the Stencel Court stated that one of the underlying
reasons for the holding in Feres - that the federal government was
not liable under the FTCA for a soldier's injuries incurred incident
to military service - was the effect that the action might have on
military discipline. 23 2 The Stencel Court expanded the Feres holding

by stating that the claim's effect on military discipline was the same
whether the suit against the federal government under the FTCA was
brought by an injured soldier or by a third party. 23 "The trial would,
in either case, involve second-guessing military orders, and would
often require members of the Armed Services to testify in court as
to each other's decisions and actions. '

23 4

For this reason as well, the

third party indemnity action by Stencel against the United States was
barred by the Feres doctrine, just as the direct action under235 the
FTCA by Donham against the federal government was barred.
4. Chappell v. Wallace
Following the Stencel decision, the Supreme Court, in Chappell
v. Wallace,236 expanded the Feres doctrine to explicitly bar claims by
soldiers against their superiors for constitutional violations. 2 7 Chap-

pell, unlike the cases previously discussed, did not involve a claim
against the United States made under authority of the FTCA. In
Chappell, enlisted soldiers brought a suit against their superior officers to recover damages for alleged constitutional rights violations
of racial discrimination. 28 The Court stated that, based on the strict

demands necessary for discipline and immediate compliance to orders
required by the military on the battlefield, which must be taught to
soldiers through their everyday training, "[c]ivilian courts must ...
hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper
with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel
and their superior officers.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

'23 9

Therefore, the Court held that Feres

Id. at 671.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 671-72.
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id. The Court stated that "the right of a third party to recover in an indemnity
action against the United States . . . must be held limited by the rationale of
Feres where the injured party is a service-man." Id. at 674.
462 U.S. 296 (1983).
Id. at 305
Id. at 297. The soldiers also alleged that their superiors conspired "to deprive
them of [their] rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985." Id.
Id. at 300.
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barred any claim by enlisted military personnel against their superior
24
officers for constitutional violations. 0
5.

United States v. Shearer

In United States v. Shearer,2 4' the mother of a murdered Army
Private sued the United States under the authority of the FTCA,
claiming that the Army's negligence resulted in her son's death.242
The Army knew that Private Shearer's murderer, Private Heard, had
previously been convicted of manslaughter while he was assigned to
an Army base in Germany. 2 3 The respondent claimed that her son's
Army superiors negligently failed to: (1)control Private Heard; (2)
warn others that Private Heard was at large; and (3) remove Private
2
Heard from active duty. "
The Court stated that the mother's three claims against the
United States were barred by Feres because the claims went "directly
to the 'management' of the military; [calling] into question basic
choices about the discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman. ' 245 The Court found that these claims "would require Army
246
officers 'to testify in court as to each other's decisions and actions"'
and that Stencel specifically barred such claims. 247 Because the claims
would involve the courts in the second-guessing of military officers,
the Shearer Court ruled that the suit could not be maintained under
the authority of the FTCA. 248 Therefore, the Shearer Court expanded
the Feres doctrine to prohibit families from recovering damages from
the United States under the FTCA for the alleged wrongful death of
a soldier when the death occurred during military service. 249
6.

United States v. Stanley

In 1987, the United States6Supreme Court, in United States v.
Stanley, 250 again applied the Feres Doctrine. In the late 1950's, Master
Sergeant James B. Stanley was "secretly administered doses of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), pursuant to an Army plan to study
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 305.
473 U.S. 52 (1985).
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. (quoting in part Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S.
666, 673 (1977)).
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 59.
Id.
483 U.S. 669 (1987).
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209

the effects of the drug on human subjects." ' 251 In 1969, Stanley was
discharged from the Army. 2 2 It was not until 1975 that Stanley
sent to him by the Army, that he had been
learned, from a letter
213
LSD.
with
injected
Stanley filed suit under the FTCA "alleging negligence in the
administration, supervision, and subsequent monitoring of the drug
testing program. '25 4 Stanley claimed that the LSD caused him to
suffer hallucinations and memory loss, hurt his military performance,
and also caused him to beat his wife and children. 251 Stanley also
claimed that his constitutional rights were violated by individual
federal officers. 2 6 Furthermore, the veteran alleged that the United
in failing to warn, monitor, or treat him followStates was negligent
25 7
ing his discharge.
The Court found that, although Stanley was not acting under
orders from superiors when the LSD was injected, the administration
of the LSD occurred "incident to service. '25 The Court refused to
look into the "extent to which particular suits would call into question
military discipline and decisionmaking" 25 9 because such an inquiry
would be intruding into military matters. 260 The Court stated that
to ensure
focusing solely on the "incident to service" test helped
261
that the inquiry into military matters was minimized.
Therefore, the Stanley Court reaffirmed Chappel's holding-that
owing to "the unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and Congress's activity in the field, ' 262 claims against the United
States by Armed Service members for violations of constitutional
rights that occurred incident to service would not be allowed. 263 These
claims would not be allowed regardless of whether an actual chainof-command, officer-subordinate relationship existed with the defendants at the time of the alleged constitutional violation and regardless
of whether the claimed wrongs involved military discipline in acting
on direct orders in performing one's military duty. 264 Because the
injection occurred incident to service, the Court ruled that the United

251. Id. at 671.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 671-72.
254. Id. at 672.
255. Id. at 671.
256. Id. at 674.
257. Id. at 672-73.
258. Id. at 680-81.
259. Id. at 682.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 683.
262. Id. (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)).
263. Id. at 683-84.
264. Id.
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States, according to Feres, was excepted by the FTCA from liability
for any constitutional violations to Stanley.2

65

7.
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. and the Government
Contractor Defense
In 1988, the Court revisited the Feres doctrine in Boyle v. United
Technologies Corporation.26 David Boyle, a United States Marine
helicopter pilot, crashed off the coast of Virginia Beach, Virginia
during a training exercise. 26 7 Boyle survived the impact of the crash
but subsequently
drowned because he could not escape from the
helicopter . 261
Employing two theories of liability under Virginia tort law,
Boyle's father sued the builder of the helicopter, United Technologies
Corp. (United). 269 Mr. Boyle claimed that United had defectively
repaired one of the parts of the helicopter's automatic flight control
system. 270 He alleged that the improperly repaired part malfunctioned
and caused the crash. 271 Mr. Boyle also alleged that the emergency
escape system of the helicopter had been defectively designed, had
trapped his son in the downed helicopter, and had caused his son's
272
drowning.
The Court stated that because "Feres prohibits all service-related
tort claims against the Government, a contractor defense that rests
upon it should prohibit all service-related tort claims against the
manufacturer. ' 27 The Court held that the design of the military
helicopter, including its emergency escape system, was a discretionary
function of the federal government. 274 Section 2680(a) of the FTCA
exempts the federal government from liability for "[a]ny claim ...
based upon the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or
perform, a discretionary function or duty ' 27" by the United States.
Therefore, the Court held that the United States was exempt from
the suit under section 2680(a) of the FTCA. 276 The Court then went

one step further and stated:
265. Id. at 684.
266. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 502.
Id.
Id. at 502-03.
Id. at 503.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 511 ("We think that the selection of the appropriate design for military
equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function
within the meaning of [§ 2680 of the FTCAJ.").

275. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
276. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
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It makes little sense to insulate the Government against
financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature
of military equipment is necessary when the Government
produces the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for
the production. In sum, we are of the view that state law
which holds Government contractors liable for design defects
in military equipment does in some circumstances present a
"significant conflict" with federal policy and must be dis2 77

placed.

The Court adopted a three-part test, the satisfaction of which
would establish a Government contractor's immunity from liability
for design defects in military equipment under the FTCA. 278 First,
the United States must have provided the contractor with "reasonably
precise specifications.

' 279

Second,

the equipment provided by the

contractor must have conformed to those specifications. 2 0 Finally,
the supplier must have warned the federal government about dangers
known to the supplier but not known by the United States. 211 According to the Boyle Court, if all three factors are met, the federal
government contractor will be free from liability for injuries
to service
22
members resulting from the product's design defects.
The three-part test adopted in Boyle is relevant to claims for
damages from the United States by veterans and their families for
injuries caused by GWS. Claimants may try to sue the federal
government contractors who made the investigational drugs that
soldiers were required to take. Claimants may also try to sue any
federal government contractors who manufactured the depleted uranium used by the United States military to coat tank armor and
artillery shells.
8.

In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation

Between 1961 and 1971, over fifty-thousand tons of a toxic
defoliant called Agent Orange was sprayed on Southeast Asia forests. 28 3 Agent Orange, used during the Vietnam War, got its name

277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 512.
Id.
Id.
Id. The first two factors place the suit within the "discretionary function"
exception to liability provided by § 2680(a) of the FTCA, because, if met, a

federal government officer must have made some of the decisions regarding
the military equipment. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Mystery, supra note 7, at A6.

212
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barrels. 2 4

because it was shipped in orange-striped
It was made from
a combination of two herbicides: 2,4-D and 2,4,5,-T,2 8 5 and it was
used in an attempt to defoliate the Vietnam forests, which would
thereby reduce enemy concealment. 2 6 The defoliant was also used to
destroy crops in Vietnam, which would thereby deprive enemy soldiers
of food. 287 In early 1970, the DOD
ceased military operations that
288
used Agent Orange in Vietnam.
Many Vietnam veterans became ill following the Vietnam War
with a wide range of health problems including: cancer, skin conditions, nervousness, numbness, hearing impairments, vision impairments, and reduced libido. 28 9 In addition, some children of Vietnam
War veterans were born with birth defects. 290 In In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation, Vietnam veterans and their
family members sued nineteen chemical companies that produced the
Agent Orange used in Vietnam. 291 The veterans alleged that the
companies negligently manufactured and sold the defoliant to the
federal government, knowing it contained dioxin,2 92 and that exposure
to Agent Orange caused their injuries. 293 Some of the families of the
Vietnam veterans also claimed that the soldiers' exposure caused the
spouses of the veterans to have miscarriages and also caused birth
defects in the soldiers' children. 294 The defendant chemical companies
filed third-party complaints against the United States, under Rule
14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking indemnification
in the event that they were found liable to the plaintiffs. 291

284. Ellen Tannenbaum, The Pratt-Weinstein Approach to Mass Tort Litigation,
52 BROOK L. REV. 455, 456 n.4 (1986).
285. Id. at 456.
286. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 776 (E.D.N.Y.
1980); Tannenbaum, supra note 284, at 457 n.12 (stating Agent Orange made
up 9407o of the defoliants used in Vietnam).
287. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 779.
288. Tannenbaum, supra note 284, at 459.
289. Id. at 458-59.
290. Id.
291. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 768. Although Agent Orange was not decided
by the United States Supreme Court, it is examined in this Comment because
of the similarity in the injuries to veterans and their families caused by Agent
Orange and the injuries sustained by veterans and their families as a result of
GWS.
292. Tannenbaum, supra note 284, at 461.
293. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 769. The plaintiffs alleged their injuries were
caused by exposure to Agents Orange, Pink, Purple and Green, which will be
grouped together and referred to as "Agent Orange" for the purposes of this
paper. Id. at 768 n.1.
294. Id. at 769.
295. Id. at 768-69.

19961

Gulf War Syndrome

In a pretrial ruling, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York dismissed the third-party claims of the
defendant chemical companies against the federal government. 296 In
light of Stencel, the court determined that if the plaintiff would be
barred from direct action against the government, the third-party
claims at issue would also be barred.297 The district court, therefore,
first considered if the plaintiff's would have a cause of action directly
against the government. 298 Addressing each class of plaintiff in turn,
the court held that all such claims would be barred by Feres because
the injuries arose from, or were incident
to, the veterans' alleged
299
exposure during their military service.
The district court, therefore, held that, as all plaintiff claims
would have been barred, all third-party complaints against the United
States for indemnity or contribution were also barred. 3°° The court,
following Feres, therefore, dismissed the third-party complaints against
the United States as exempt from the FTCA.30°
The court then turned its attention to the motions between the
named parties.30 2 The court declined to grant the defendants' motion
for summary judgment. 30 3 The defendants relied on the federal government contractor defense. 3° The court acknowledged the relevance
of the affirmative defense to the instant litigation. Finding numerous
facts in dispute, however,
the court declined to grant the summary
30 5
judgment motion.
Subsequently, at another motions hearing, 3°0 the court reasoned
that the federal government contractor defense could be asserted in
strict liability suits, including those filed in the Agent Orange litigation.30 7 In order for the defendants to be free from liability,
296. Id. at 776-81.
297. Id. at 772.

298. Id.
299. Id. at 776-81. The four plaintiff groups included Vietnam Veterans, their
spouses, their parents, and their children. Id. at 769. The Veterans' claims
would have been barred by Feres, as their injuries arose directly out of their
exposure to Agent Orange during their military service. Id. at 776. Family
member claims would also have been barred as they were indirectly caused by
the veterans' military exposure. Id. at 781. Thus, any subsequent loss or injuries
would be considered incident to the veterans' military service, and barred by
Feres. Id.

300. Id. at 781.
301. Id. at 782. The federal district court also stated that the Feres doctrine was
not applicable to the direct litigation between the plaintiffs and the defendant
chemical companies. Id. at 772.
302. Id. at 794.
303. Id. at 795.
304. Id.
305. Id.

306. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
307. Id. at 1055.
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however, the court stated that Boyle's three requirements had to be
met.30 s Each defendant had to prove that the specifications for Agent
Orange were established by the government; that the defendants met
these specifications in all material respects; and that the government
knew at least as much as the defendants about the hazards to humans
created by Agent Orange. 3 9 Absent proof of all three of these
elements, the affirmative contractor defense would fail.31 0
Upon reconsideration in 1984, the court affirmed the dismissal
of the third-party claims against the federal government concerning
the injuries of the servicemen and the derivative claims of their
families for wrongful death and loss of consortium."' The court,
however, reversed its earlier dismissal of the third-party claims against
the United States which pertained to the independent claims by the
31 2
family members for genetic damage, birth defects, and miscarriages.
3
13
The court relied on Orken v. United States, in which the federal
government conceded that Feres did not bar the wrongful death
actions on behalf of a soldier's spouse and children who were killed
when an Air Force plane crashed into their house on the military
base. 31 4 Therefore, the court held that although Feres and Stencel
barred the claims of injured servicemen and the derivative claims of
their families, the cases did not bar independent315 claims by the
family members against the federal government and that
the United
31 6
States could be a third-party defendant in the action.

308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. In its discussion of the Boyle elements, the court identified the third element
as central to the success or failure of the affirmative defense. Id. at 1057. The
court stated that the third element would not be met by a defendant if it was
found that the defendant failed to disclose to the Government any hazards
known to the defendant that might have affected the Government's decision
whether to use Agent Orange during the Vietnam conflict. Id. at 1057-58. The
determination of whether this third requirement had been satisfied was to be
made at trial. Id. at 1058.
311. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 1244; see supra notes 292-94 and accompanying
text.
312. Id.
313. 239 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1956).
314. Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 1248 (citing Government Brief at 3, cited in 1
LESTER S. JAYSON,

HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE & JU-

DICiA REMEDIES § 156, at 5-146.10 (1964)).
315. The Agent Orange court stated that family member claims which would not
have occurred if not for the fact that a servicemember was exposed to a
harmful substance are claims that are "derivative" of the servicemember's
claim. Id. Family members suing for their own direct injuries (such as injuries
sustained by a military plane crash that injures the family member and the
servicemember simultaneously) are independent claims. Id.
316. Id. at 1244.
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Unfortunately for family members who have independent claims
based on GWS, the Agent Orange case never went to trial. On the
scheduled trial date, May 7, 1984, the veterans and the defendants
reached a settlement in which the chemical companies agreed to pay
$180 million dollars into a trust fund.3 17 The court agreed to accept
' In 1989, over
the settlement after finding that it was reasonable. 18
39,000 Vietnam veterans, whose illnesses were allegedly caused by
Agent Orange, began receiving compensation
checks from this settle319
ment with the defoliant's manufacturers.
9. Can Gulf War Syndrome Claimants Get Past the Feres
Hurdle?
a.

Veteran Claimants

The Feres doctrine will bar claims under the FTCA by Armed
Service members and veterans against the United States for tort
liability resulting from GWS. In Feres, the Court held that soldiers
were precluded from recovering damages from the federal government
under the FTCA for "injuries to servicemen where the injuries ar[o]se
out of or [were] in the course of activity incident to service." 3 20 Any
injuries caused by GWS arose out of the veterans' service in the
Persian Gulf War. Therefore, Feres precludes veterans with GWS
from suing the federal government under the FTCA for damages for
their illnesses.

317. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 748. In addition, the terms of the settlement
included the defendants' denial of "any liability or wrongdoing whatsoever."
Id. at 862.
318. Id. at 857.
319. Mystery, supra note 7, at A6. The settlement, however, was not the only means
that veterans had to recover for injuries resulting from contact with Agent
Orange. Additionally, section 1116 of the VBA provided that veterans who
served on active duty in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era, and
who were exposed during this time to Agent Orange and other defoliants used
by the United States, shall be presumed to have incurred any of the several
designated diseases during their service. 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994). Section 1116
list of diseases includes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, soft-tissue sarcoma, and
chloracne, all of which must have manifested a minimum of a 10% disability
in the veteran in order for the presumption to take place..Id. § 1116(2)(A)(C). Hodgkin's disease and respiratory cancers, if either result in a minimum
of a 10% disability, have also recently been added to the list of diseases
presumed to have been incurred during the veteran's service in Vietnam during
the Vietnam era. Id. § 1116 (1994). Therefore, section 1116 authorized monthly
compensation to Vietnam veterans for their injuries caused by Agent Orange
according to the monthly compensation scheme stated in 38 U.S.C. § 1114 of
the VBA.
320. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
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b. Family Members Suing for Derivative Claims
Family members of soldiers with GWS will also be barred from
suing the federal government under the FTCA for derivative claims
based on the veterans' illnesses. The Shearer Court expanded the
Feres doctrine to prohibit families that file derivative suits from
recovering damages under the FTCA from the United States when
3 21
the claim arose from an injury incurred incident to military service.
Derivative claims, such as wrongful death claims owing to GWS,
therefore, are barred under Feres because the claim, as with the
claim in Shearer, would go "directly to the 'management' of the
military; [calling] into question basic choices about the discipline,
supervision, and control of a serviceman. '32 2 The Court, in Stencel,
32 3
specifically stated that such claims under the FTCA were barred.
The Shearer Court's holding bars derivative suits under the FTCA
by family members of veterans with GWS because
such claims would
3 24
require a court to second-guess military officers.
c.

Family Members Suing for Their Own Injuries

A court following the 1984 Agent Orange holding might allow
independent claims of GWS made by a spouse or a child of a veteran.
The Agent Orange court held that although Feres and Stencel barred
claims of injured servicemen and the derivative claims of their
families, the cases did not bar independent claims by the family
32
members against the United States.
The substantial weight of authority, however, shows that family
members of veterans with GWS most likely will not be able to sue
the United States for their own injuries attributable to the servicemember's injury. Although the Court has not explicitly addressed a
case involving an injury to a family member attributable to a servicemember's injury, the Court, in Stencel, stated:
[W]here the case concerns an injury sustained by a soldier
while on duty, the effect of a action upon military discipline
is identical whether the suit is brought by the soldier directly
or by a third party. The litigation would take virtually the
identical form in either case, and at issue would be the
degree of fault, if any, on the part of the Government's
321. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
322. Id. at 58.
323. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1977).

324. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 59.
325. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (E.D.N.Y.
1984). See supra notes 312-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of an
"independent" claim by a veteran's family member.
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agents and the effect upon the serviceman's safety.

26

This statement implies that the Court would not allow family members of a veteran with GWS to sue for their own injuries attributable
to the veteran's GWS.
Further support for the theory that the Court will bar such
claims by family members is revealed through several federal circuit
cases, which have held that Feres prohibits family members of soldiers
from suing the government for their own injuries, such as birth
defects, genetic damages, and miscarriages, attributable to the ser-27
vicemember's injury. For example, in Mondelli v. United States
the plaintiff, Rosemarie Mondelli, brought suit under the FTCA for
her genetic injuries,3 28 which were allegedly caused by her father's
radiation exposure when he was on active duty in the Army.3 29 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that
Mondelli's suit raised the same Feres doctrine issues that would have
been raised if her father had sued for his injuries.3 0 The court also
stated: "[T]he Supreme Court has construed the FTCA to subordinate
the interests of children of service personnel to the exigencies of
military discipline." 3 3 ' Therefore, the court concluded that Feres
barred Mondelli's suit under the FTCA because the injuries were
derived from her father's exposure to radiation
and because such
3 2
exposure occurred incident to military service. 1
In Lombard v. United States,333 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reached a holding similar to
the Mondelli decision. Theodore Lombard worked on the "Manhattan Project" from 1944 to 1946, while serving on active duty in the
Army.33 4 During his work on the project he handled radioactive
substances.3 35 Lombard's four children allegedly suffered from genetic
injuries caused by their father's radiation exposure during his military
service.3 3 6 Additionally, Lombard's wife claimed to have suffered
emotional distress and mental anguish as a result of the care that

326. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673 (emphasis added).

327. 711 F.2d 567 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984).
328. The plaintiff was born with retinal blastoma, a cancer of the retina which is
genetically transmitted. The retinal blastoma caused her to lose the use of her
left eye. Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567, 568 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984).
329. Id. at 567.
330. Id. at 569.
331. Id. at 570.
332. Id. at 569.
333. 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983).
334. Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 216-17.
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she was required to give to injured family members.33 7 The court
ruled that the claims under the FTCA, for injuries to the children
and to the mother incurred as a result of Mr. Lombard's exposure
to radiation, were barred by Feres because "each claim had its
'genesis' in an injury to a serviceman incident to military service." '3 8
The Supreme Court never had the opportunity to review the
Agent Orange holding because the case was settled. Therefore, less
weight must be given to this holding than to those cases which the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to review. Based on the Supreme
Court's holding in Stencel, and based on the holdings of federal
circuit courts in cases such as Mondelli and Lombard, it appears
that the Court will bar suits by family members based upon their
individual injuries which are attributable to GWS.
d.

Suits Against Government Contractors

Veterans with GWS and their family members may attempt to
sue the manufacturers of pyridostigmine, botulinum toxoid, or chlorpyrifos. They may also attempt to sue the manufacturers of the
depleted uranium used by the United States military during the
Persian Gulf War. The claimants may allege that these manufacturers
negligently produced their product and that such negligence caused
their GWS.
However, these claims will be barred under the Feres doctrine
if the three-part test of Boyle is satisfied. According to Boyle, if a
government contractor shows that the United States provided the
contractor with "reasonably precise specifications;" 33 9 that the equip34
ment provided by the contractor conformed to those specifications; 1
and that the supplier warned the federal government about dangers
known to the supplier but not known by the United States,34' then
the contractor will be immune from tort liability for injuries caused
by the product.
However, any government contractors who fail to meet the Boyle
test will not be immune from liability. Additionally, such contractors
will be unable to cross-claim for indemnification from the United
States for their liability under the Supreme Court's holding in Stencel.

337.
338.
339.
340.

Id. at 217.
Id. at 226.
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
Id. The first two factors place the suit within the "discretionary function"
exception to liability provided by section 2680(a) of the FTCA because, if met,
a federal government officer must have exercised discretion in making some
of the decisions regarding the military equipment. Id.
341. Id.
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E. Violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or the
Department of Defense Authorization Act
Both pyridostigmine and botulinum toxoid are regulated by the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDC Act), 42 which prohibits the
interstate transport of "investigational" drugs.3 43 According to section
355(i) of the FDC Act, physicians are required to obtain the informed
consent of their patients before treating them with investigational
drugs unless their consent is "not feasible" or unless obtaining
informed consent would not be in their best interests. 3 " Furthermore,
the FDA has approved the use of investigational drugs to treat "lifethreatening"45 conditions in which "no comparable drug therapy is
3
available."
In Doe v. Sullivan, the plaintiffs challenged a Pentagon policy
that required all soldiers to take the investigational drugs pyridostigmine and botulinum toxoid based upon Iraq's use of chemical and
biological weapons in past conflicts. 34 The soldiers' informed consent
3 47
was not obtained before they were given the investigational drugs.
The Pentagon concluded that the military mission in the Gulf
War would have been jeopardized if soldiers had been given the
choice as to whether to take the two drugs because many soldiers
would have chosen to stay "drug free." 3 " The Pentagon contended
that those soldiers who refused would have become liabilities on the
battlefield. 349 Furthermore, the medical community tested these drugs
prior to the Gulf War and knew that "the drugs could be safely
ingested by humans and that the drugs were effective antidotes to
Iraqi chemical and biological weapons." 3 50 The known side effects
to the drugs "were much less harmful than the lethal consequences
of botulism and nerve gas." 35 ' Based on these factors,
the Pentagon
35 2
convinced the FDA to promulgate Rule 23(d)(1).
342. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).
343. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1994). Drugs that the FDA has not approved for marketing
to the general public are called "investigational drugs." Id. § 355(a),(i).
344. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1994) (stating in part:
[E]xperts using [investigational] drugs ...
will inform any human
beings to whom such drugs .

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

.

. are to be administered .

.

. and will

obtain the consent of such human beings or their representatives,
except where [the experts] deem it not feasible or, in their professional
judgment, contrary to the best interests of such human beings.).
21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (1995).
Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12, 13 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 938 F.2d 1370, 1372
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 80.
Id. at 83.
Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. at 17.
Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 103 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 103-04 (footnotes omitted).
21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d) (1995).
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Rule 23(d)(1), promulgated on December 21, 1990, allows the
FDA Commissioner to determine that informed consent of military
personnel is not required for investigational drugs during specific
military operations involving either combat or the immediate threat
of combat, owing to the existence of military combat exigency (actual
or threatened). 53 Under the rule, informed consent of armed service
members is unnecessary if the soldiers must take the drugs in order
to accomplish the mission and to preserve the individual's health and
the safety of other military personnel.35 4 Informed consent can only
be denied when the Commissioner determines that treatment is in
the best interests of the military personnel and that an alternative
method of treatment does not exist.355 The Commissioner waived the
DOD's informed consent requirement under Rule 23(d)for botulinum
toxoid on December 31, 1990, and for pyridostigmine on January 8,
1991, upon a determination that obtaining the informed consent of
35 6
the soldiers was not feasible.
Section 1401(c)(1) of the 1985 DOD Authorization Act (DAA)357
provides that DOD funds may not be used for experimental research
on humans unless the person's informed consent is obtained prior to
the experiment or, if the research is intended to be beneficial to the
subject, the informed consent of the legal representative of the person
is obtained.35 According to the language of the statute, therefore,
the military must obtain a soldier's informed consent before the DOD
conducts "research" on him, regardless of whether the research is
intended to benefit the subject. Therefore, section 1401(c)(1) of the
DAA only would apply to Gulf War veterans if the Pentagon used
investigational drugs on the soldiers for "research" purposes.
In Doe v. Sullivan,3 59 a Gulf War soldier using a fictitious name,
sued to enjoin the FDA and the DOD from requiring that soldiers
353. Id. Rule 23(d)(1) allows the FDA Commissioner to determine that informed
consent is not feasible in situations "involving combat or the immediate threat
of combat." Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.

356. Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1374 (D.C. Cir.), aff'g, 756 F. Supp. 12
(D.D.C. 1991); Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 84.
357. Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 1401(c)(1), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 2492, 2615
(1984) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 980 (1988)).
358. Id. Section 1401(c)(1) states:
Funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may not be used
for research involving a human being as an experimental subject
unless(1) the informed consent of the subject is obtained in advance; or
(2) in the case of research intended to be beneficial to the subject,
the informed consent of the subject or a legal representative of the
subject is obtained in advance.
Id.

359. 756 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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take the investigational drugs used by soldiers in the Gulf War. 316
Doe contended that the FDA waiver of the military's informed
consent obligations violated section 505(i) of the FDC Act. 6 ' Doe
also contended that the Pentagon violated section 1401(c)(1) of the
DAA because the use of investigational drugs on the soldiers constituted "research,"
thereby necessitating the informed consent of the
3 62
soldiers.
The federal district court dismissed Doe's complaint after finding
the issue to be non-justiciable because of the relationship between
soldiers and their superior officers.3 63 The court stated that even if
the issue had been justiciable, the court would have found that the
DAA was not violated because the Pentagon was not conducting
"research" by requiring soldiers to take the drugs.3 64 The district
court found that "the primary purpose of administering the drugs
[was] military, not scientific. 3 65 Therefore, the DOD requirement
that informed consent be obtained from human subjects prior to
conducting research was held to be inapplicable to Doe's case. 366
The court also stated that the FDC Act was not violated because
the FDA could reasonably find that informed consent was not feasible
during war and that the waiver of the informed consent requirement
was, therefore, lawful.3 67 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the case was
3 69
justiciable3 68 and affirmed the district court's decision on the merits.
The Doe court correctly held that the military did not violate
section 1401(c)(1) of the DAA by requiring soldiers to take the
investigational drugs. The Pentagon did not give the soldiers the
drugs for the purpose of conducting human "research." Hundreds
of thousands of soldiers took pyridostigmine and botulinum toxoid.
Therefore, the Gulf War administration of investigational drugs did
not involve the small test size population common in research experiments. In addition, soldiers in different units were given different
quantities of the drugs depending on each unit commander's orders,
which were based on the likelihood of the unit's contact with nerve
agents. 70 The unit commanders' control over the quantity of the

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Id.
Id.at 1375.
Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. at 14-15.
Id. at 15-16.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16-17.
Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1380.
Id. at 1382-83.
Schuchardt, supra note 6, at 104.
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drugs taken indicates that the military was not conducting human
research but was instead trying to keep troops safe and healthy.
Because human "research" was not conducted, section 1401(c)(1)
was not violated.
In addition, no violation of the FDC Act occurred because the
FDA Commissioner's waiver of informed consent under Rule 23(d)(1)
was necessary to accomplish the37mission and to preserve the health
and safety of American soldiers.

The goal of keeping military casualties to a minimum justified
the use of the two drugs in the Gulf War. The drugs were not used
for research but were used to protect American soldiers. Concern
for military discipline and control justified the Government's decision
not to inform Gulf War soldiers of the possible dangers associated
with the two drugs. Furthermore, there is no evidence to show that
the federal government was aware, at the time it required the soldiers
to take the drugs, of the dangerous side-effects of using combinations
of pyridostigmine and the herbicides used in the war. Neither the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act nor the DAA were violated by the
military's requirement that soldiers take pyridostigmine and botulinum toxoid without the soldiers' informed consent.
F.

Compensation Under the Veterans' Benefits Act

1. The Veterans' Benefits Act in General
The Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA)172 "establishes, as a substitute
for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme which
provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to
any negligence attributable to the Government.

3 73

The Act "serves

a dual purpose: it not only provides a swift, efficient remedy for the
injured serviceman, but it also clothes the Government in the 'protective mantle of the Act's limitation-of-liability provisions.'

3 74

The VBA presumes that veterans are in sound physical condition
75
after their examination and after their acceptance into the military.1
Therefore, any injuries or diseases suffered or contracted by a veteran
while on active service in the Armed Forces are deemed by the'Act
371. Id. at 83; Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. at 17.

372. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-8527 (1994).
373. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671 (1977).

374. Id. at 673 (quoting in part Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417
U.S. 106, 115 (1974)). "Given the broad exposure of the Government, and the
great variability in the potentially applicable tort law, . . . the military com-

pensation scheme provides an upper limit of liability for the Government as
to service-connected injuries." Id.
375. 38 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994).
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to have been incurred in the line of duty as long as the injury was
3 76
not the result of the injured party's own willful misconduct.
Additionally, for any chronic disease 77 that becomes "manifest to a
degree of [ten] percent or more within one year from the date of
separation'3 78 of any veteran who served for at least ninety days
during a period of war, is considered to have been incurred in or
aggravated by the military service.379 In other words, the veteran is
deemed to have incurred the chronic disease in the line of duty as
long as the disease develops to the required status within one year
of his separation from the war, even if the veteran does not leave
the military until thirty years after fighting in a war. Any soldier
suffering a disease or injury in the line of duty, whether during a
380
period of war or not, will be compensated by the United States.
Section 1114 of the VBA lists the rates for wartime disability
compensation. 3"' For example, if the veteran has a ten percent disability, the monthly compensation is $87.382 If there is a ofie hundred
percent disability, monthly compensation is $1774.383 Section 1114
also provides monthly compensation rates for the loss of, or the loss
of use of, arms, legs, eyesight, and hearing and provides a maximum
ceiling compensation amount that can be obtained from all of the
combined disabilities. 3u A veteran whose service-connected one hundred percent disability renders him permanently housebound shall
receive monthly compensation of $1985.385 In addition, veterans with
a minimum of a thirty percent disability receive additional compen38 6
sation depending on the number of dependents they have.
If a veteran dies as a result of a service-connected or compensable
disability and the veteran was never dishonorably discharged from
the Armed Services, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs "shall pay
dependency and indemnity compensation to such veteran's surviving
spouse, children, and parents." 3 7 The monthly amount of compen376. Id. § 105(a).
377. The term "chronic disease" includes, for example: progressive muscular atrophy, arthritis, peptic ulcers, and malignant tumors of the brain or spinal cord
or peripheral nerves. Id. § 1101(3).
378. Id. § 1112(a)(1) (emphasis added).
379. Id. § 11 12(a).
380. Id. §§ 1110 (compensation for injuries incurred during a period of war) and
1131 (compensation for injuries incurred during a non-war period). These
sections apply as long as the injury did not occur due to the soldier's willful
misconduct.
381. Id. § 1114.
382. Id. § 1114(a).
383. Id. § 1114(j).
384. Id. § 1114(k)-(p).
385. Id. § 1114(s).
386. Id. § 1115.
387. Id. § 1310(a).
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sation is dependent upon the veteran's rank at the time of death.38 2. Benefits Under the VBA for Veterans with Gulf War
Syndrome
According to the VBA, the Persian Gulf War is listed as a
"period of war." 38 9 The soldiers who were injured while serving in
this war, therefore, are entitled to the established disability benefits
for injuries incurred during a period of war. However, soldiers with
GWS faced problems in receiving compensation and hospital care
under the VBA because there was no VA diagnosis for the GWS
symptoms.319 GWS was not recognized as a disease because the
symptoms commonly referred to as GWS had not been formally
diagnosed, and "without a diagnosis for their illness, veterans do
not qualify for medical compensation [under the VBA] from the
government." 3 91 Thus, veterans with GWS could not be compensated
in the past under the VBA for their GWS because the VA stated
that "there [was]
no proof that their illnesses were caused by service
3 92
in the Gulf.''
The inability of veterans to be compensated under the VBA for
GWS, however, changed in 1994 with the enactment of section 1117
to the VBA.3 93 Congress stated: "veterans who are seriously ill as
the result of [GWS] .

..

should be given the benefit of the doubt

and be provided compensation benefits to offset the impairment in
earnings capacities they may be experiencing. ' ' 39 In support of this
philosophy, section 1117 was added to the VBA.3 95 Section 1117
provides compensation for Persian Gulf veterans:
suffering from a chronic disability resulting from an undiagnosed illness (or combination of undiagnosed illnesses)
that(1) became manifest during service on active duty in the
Armed Forces in the Southwest Asia theater of operations
during the Persian Gulf War; or
388. See id. § 1311.
389. Id. § 101(11).
390. 60 Minutes, supra note 125; Daniel Williams, U.S. Hides Evidence of Gulf
Chemical Arms, Senator Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1994, at A48. Before
veterans can receive compensation for an illness, the VA ordinarily must
recognize that the illness is a disease that was caused by, or occurred during,
the veteran's active military service.
391. Gulf War Syndrome Research Boosted, Sci. NEWS, Oct. 15, 1994, at 252.
392. Tippit, supra note 7, at 100.
393. 38 U.S.C. § 1117 (1994).
394. Veterans' Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 103-446, 108 Stat. 4650 (codified at 38
U.S.C. §§ 101-1701 (1994)).
395. 38 U.S.C. § 1117 (1994).
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(2) became manifest to a degree of [ten] percent or more
within the presumptive period [of time following service
prescribed by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs]. 39
The Secretary of Veterans Affairs must establish the symptoms of
GWS for which benefits under the VBA may be received.3 97
Section 1152 of the VBA states that the death and disability
benefits of Chapter 11 of the VBA3 9s are granted to persons recognized as having a compensable status.3a Because the Gulf War
veterans have a compensable status according to section 1117, section
1152 authorizes them to be compensated for any disabilities from
GWS pursuant to the rates established in section 1114 of the VBA.
Section 1117 has allowed the VA to "deviate from standard
procedure and begin paying disability claims to Persian Gulf veterans
even though the illness has not been defined."' ' 0 As of April 13,
1995, veterans may receive compensation of up to $1823 per month
in disability payments and subsidized medical care for GWS. 4'4 Also,
veterans with GWS shall receive hospital care and may receive nursing
home care. 402 Furthermore, any veteran who was exposed to a toxic
substance or an environmental hazard while serving in the Persian
Gulf theater during the Persian Gulf War "is eligible for hospital
care and nursing home care . . . for any disability." 403 As of April
27, 1995, eighty-five Desert Storm veterans had received disability
checks under the VBA for injuries caused by GWS.4 Those veterans

396. Id. § 1117(a) (emphasis added).
397. Id. § 1117(c). The Secretary of Veterans Affairs is to prescribe regulations
which describe the "period and geographical area or areas of military service
in connection with which compensation . . . may be paid," the illnesses which
can be compensated, and the relevant medical characteristics of each of these
illnesses. Id.
398. Chapter 11 of the Veterans' Benefits Act is titled: "Compensation for ServiceConnected Disability or Death."
399. 38 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994).
400. Duerksen, supra note 5.
401. Walker, supra note 6, at B13.
402. 38 U.S.C. § 1710(a)(l)(A) (1994).
403. Id. § 1710(e)(l)(C). Additionally, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs may also
furnish, either on an outpatient or on an ambulatory basis, medical services
for any disability to a Gulf War veteran who may have been exposed to an
environmental hazard or to a toxic substance while serving in the Southwest
Asia theater of operations during the Gulf War. Id. § 1712. Persian Gulf War
veterans can find out more information concerning available medical care and
other benefits by dialing (800) 749-8387, a toll-free number set up by the
Department of Navy Affairs. Military Briefs, THE VIRGINIAN-PMOT AND THE
LEDGER-STAR, Mar. 13, 1995, at B5. Veterans with symptoms of GWS should
contact their local VA hospital to have a physical exam and should add their
name to the national Persian Gulf Registry. Tippit, supra note 7, at 100.
404. Duerksen, supra note 5.
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with GWS will continue to be compensated under the VBA for as
long as they remain disabled. 4°5
3.

Benefits Under the VBA for Veterans' Family Members

"Normally, the [Department of Veterans Affairs] neither monitors nor treats family members [of injured veterans].'"'4 Section
1713 of the VBA, however, authorizes the provision of health care
for the spouse or child of a veteran who has a total, permanent,
and service-connected disability. 0 Surviving spouses and children are
also to receive medical care if the veteran: "(A) died as a result of
a service-connected disability, or (B) at the time of death had a total
disability permanent in nature, resulting from a service-connected
disability." 48 If the veteran is only partially disabled by GWS and
the GWS does not cause the veteran to die, then the spouse and
child of the veteran may not receive health care even if, as a result
of the transmission of the illness from the veteran to the family
member, the spouse or child has a one hundred percent disability.
4. The Adequacy of the VBA for Those People Afflicted With
GWS
Although veterans with GWS can now receive benefits under the
VBA, the small amount of monthly compensation they receive is
grossly disproportionate in value to the debilitating injuries that many
of them sustained defending the United States. Many veterans with
GWS can no longer work as a result of their illness. With the federal
government's maximum $1823 monthly compensation check, many
veterans will be unable to pay their bills. Congress should amend
the VBA to compensate the veterans in proportion to their income
at the time of their injuries. Veterans and their families should not
be forced to endure a lower standard of living because they defended
their country.
In addition, the VBA should be amended so that the spouse or
the child to whom GWS has been transmitted is entitled to treatment
for the illness. As previously mentioned, the Feres doctrine prohibits
the injured spouse and child from suing the federal government to
recover damages for injuries caused by GWS. Congress should not
leave such injured family members without any means of compensation. For example, studies show that many infants conceived by
veterans after the war have been, and continue to be, born with
405. Id.
406. Gulf War Syndrome Research Boosted, Sci.
407. 38 U.S.C. § 1713 (1994).
408. Id. § 1713(a)(2).

NEWS,

Oct. 15, 1994, at 252.
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birth defects which are attributable to GWS.4 Forcing veterans to
bear the entirety of the enormous costs of health care for these
deformed children is an injustice, especially after one considers that
these birth defects are linked to the soldiers' service to the United
States.
V.

WILL THE FERES DOCTRINE BE AMENDED?

It is highly unlikely that either the Supreme Court or Congress
will make changes to the Feres doctrine any time in the near future.
The Court will most likely maintain the status quo and reaffirm
Feres. The Feres Court stated: "[I]f we misinterpret the [FTCA], at
least Congress possesses a ready remedy.' '410 Congress has not changed
the standard in the forty-five years since Feres was decided. The
Court, therefore, may naturally conclude that Congress does not
intend for soldiers or veterans to recover under the FTCA for injuries
which arise out of or incident to service in the Armed Forces.
Additionally, although four dissenting Justices in the Supreme Court
case of United States v. Johnson41 1 stated they would have overruled
Feres if they had been asked to do so, 412 two of the four dissenters,
Justices Brennan and Marshall, no longer serve on the Court. Based
on Congress's failure to amend the FTCA and based on the philosophies of the Justices now on the Court, it is not likely that the
Feres doctrine will be changed by either the Supreme Court or
Congress any time soon to allow veterans to recover for their GWS.
VI. SHOULD THE FERES DOCTRINE BE CHANGED TO
ALLOW RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FROM THE UNITED
STATES BY SOLDIERS WHO ARE INJURED IN THE
COURSE OF DUTY AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS?
One of the arguments for changing the Feres doctrine is 41to3
prevent atrocities such as soldiers being subjected to LSD experiments

409.
410.
411.
412.

Flanders, supra note 3, at 293; Tippit, supra note 7, at 100.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
481 U.S. 681 (1987).
Id. at 703. In Johnson, the dissenting opinion stated that Feres had been
"wrongly decided." Id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the dissent
stated that because "[we] have not been asked by the [plaintiff] to overrule
Feres, [we] need not resolve whether considerations of stare decisis should
induce us, despite the plain error of the case, to leave bad enough alone." Id.
at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
413. See Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981); Thornwell v. United States,
471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
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or being ordered to participate in atomic radiation experiments. 414
However, section 1401(c)(1) of the DAA 415 ensures that such deplorable acts will not occur and leaves the Feres doctrine in its present
state. Section 1401(c)(1) provides that DOD funds may not be used
for experimental research on humans unless "(1) the informed consent
of the subject is obtained in advance; or (2) in the case of research
intended to be beneficial to the subject, the informed consent of the
subject or a legal representative of the subject is obtained in advance. ' 416 Soldiers, therefore, may no longer be used as test subjects
without their informed consent.
In addition, soldiers already have forms of redress for harms
done to them. They may recover compensation for their injuries
under the VBA. 417 Furthermore, injured soldiers may press charges
against superior officers for committing offenses that are punishable
by court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). 418 Examples of court-martial offenses under the UCMJ
include the following: "cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment
' 419 unlawful detention, 420
of, any person subject to [one's] orders,
murder, 421 assault, 422 and conduct unbecoming an officer. 423 These
court-martial offenses ensure that officers will not order their soldiers
to undertake dangerous missions or activities without good reason.
Furthermore, in order for the military to maintain its effectiveness, it requires "strict discipline and regulation that would be
unacceptable in a civilian setting. ' 424 In order for soldiers to learn
this discipline, some freedoms and rights they enjoyed in civilian life
must be subordinated. Suits by soldiers and their family members
against the United States should be barred "because they [are] the
type of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary
in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and
effectiveness. ' 425 If soldiers were allowed to recover damages in

414. See Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3rd Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(alleging that radiation exposure during training maneuvers at nuclear testing
sites caused severe long-term injuries to themselves and their families), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
415. 10 U.S.C. § 980 (1994).
416. Id.
417. See Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-446, 108
Stat. 4650 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 3510 (1994)).
418. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1994).
419. Id. § 893.
420. Id. § 897.
421. Id. § 918.
422. Id. § 928.
423. Id. § 933.
424. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983).
425. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
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civilian courts for injuries caused by the actions of their superior
officers, the integrity of the hierarchical military chain-of-command
system would be severely damaged. Soldiers would be able to step

outside of their chain-of-command and force superior officers to
justify their actions in a civilian court. "Suits brought by service
members against the Government for service-related injuries could
undermine the commitment essential to effective service and thus
have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense
' 426
of the word.
The necessity of preventing judicial interference into the military's effective operation justifies the Feres doctrine's bar against FTCA
claims involving service members where the injury arises out of, or
is in the course of, activity incident to military service.
VII.

CONCLUSION

At least 45,000 American Persian Gulf War veterans suffer from
symptoms commonly known as GWS. 427 In addition,42 GWS has spread
to the family members of some afflicted veterans.
Veterans afflicted with GWS are presently unable to recover
damages for their injuries because any suits against the United States
by Gulf War veterans are barred by either the FTCA's "discretionary
function exception1 429 or its "combatant exception. ' 430 Even if a
veteran's suit should get over the hurdle created by these two exceptions to the FTCA, the claim would be barred by the Feres43' doctrine.
In addition, family members of soldiers with GWS are barred
from suing the federal government under the FTCA for derivative
claims, such as wrongful death actions, which are based on the
veterans' illnesses. 43 2 Family members who have GWS also will be
426. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691 (1987).
427. Flanders, supra note 5, at 96.
428. Id. (stating that a 1994 study by the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee found that "seventy-eight percent of the [veterans'] wives
had been affected [with GWS], as had twenty-five percent of children born to
them before the war and sixty-five percent born after"); France, supra note 7,
at 114; Tippit, supra note 7, at 100.
429. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (barring "[a]ny claim ...

based upon the exercise or

performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused").
430. 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1988) (excepting from the FTCA "[a]ny claim arising out
of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard,
during time of war"). Congress has declared that the Persian Gulf War was a
"period of war." 38 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1994).
431. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
432. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1984).
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unable to sue the
United States for their own independent GWS43 3
related injuries.

The only means for compensation available to veterans afflicted
with GWS is through the Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA). 4 4 For those
family members of veterans to whom GWS has been transmitted,
however, there is no means of compensation from the federal government for their individual GWS-related injuries. In addition to pot
being eligible for compensation, a veteran's spouse or child to whom
GWS has been transmitted may only receive health care under the
VBA if (1) the veteran has a one hundred percent disability which
is permanent and which was caused by GWS; (2) the veteran with
GWS died as a result of the syndrome;
or (3) the veteran had a total
435
disability at the time of death.

The federal government should increase the aid it provides to
Gulf War veterans and their family members afflicted with GWS.
This increased aid, however, should not come in the form of a
change to the Feres doctrine, which is essential for military discipline
and effectiveness. The increased aid to veterans and their families
should be provided through the VBA. The current $1823 maximum
monthly compensation check that veterans with GWS may receive is
grossly inadequate and will prevent veterans from living somewhat
comfortably with their debilitating injuries, many of which were
sustained in defense of the United States. At the very least, Congress
should amend the VBA to compensate veterans in proportion to their
income at the time of their injuries. In addition, the VBA should be
amended to authorize the provision of health care to veterans' family
members with GWS. The government should take better care of
those American veterans who are ill today as a result of their service
to the United States in the Persian Gulf War.
Kevin J. Dalton

433. See Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567, 570 (3rd Cir. 1983) (stating "the

Supreme Court has construed the FTCA to subordinate the interests of children
of service personnel to the exigencies of military discipline"); Lombard v.
United States, 690 F.2d 215, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (barring claims under the
FTCA for genetic injuries to children allegedly caused by their father's radiation
exposure during his military service and claims by the veteran's wife for

emotional distress and mental anguish resulting from her care for the injured
family because "each claim had its 'genesis' in an injury to a serviceman
incident to military service").
434. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1701 (1994).

435. See id. § 1713.

